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Abstract
The Effect of Information on Household Water and Energy Use
Water and Energy Utilities are faced with growing demand at a time when supply expan-
sion is increasingly costly, inconsistent and taxing on the environment. Given that supply
expansion is limited, to meet future needs utilities need demand-side management policies to
result in more reliable and consistent consumer responsiveness. Currently, most households
do not have access to the level or type of information needed to respond to price signals
in a reliable and e!ective way. Advanced information technology solutions exist and are
being increasingly adopted, but we need to know more about how the informational setting
a!ects decision-making, consumption levels and price responsiveness. This research analyzes
the e!ect of information on household water and energy consumption, which is a decision-
making environment characterized by uncertainty and imperfect information. This study
also analyzes additional complexities stemming from infrequent billing, non-linear pricing
structures, and combined utility bills, each of which may dampen price signals.
I first develop a theoretical model of decision-making under uncertainty. I use this model
to illustrate the e!ect of more frequent information, which eliminates uncertainty about past
decisions, on remaining decisions within the billing period. The model emphasizes the role
of risk preferences and the realization of the uncertain quantity. On average, risk averse
consumers will increase consumption when uncertainty is reduced; risk seeking consumers
will do the opposite. Introduction of a non-linear rate structure induces behavior that
makes individuals appear as if they are risk averse or risk seeking, despite their actual risk
ii
preferences. This model highlights the importance of modeling multiple decisions within a
billing period and accounting for a spectrum of risk preferences.
In Chapter 3, I create a computerized laboratory experiment designed to generate data
used to test some of the hypotheses formulated in the theoretical model presented in Chapter
2. Results from the experiment show that, on average, individuals consume more when pro-
vided with more frequent information that resolves uncertainty about past decisions made
within a single billing period. This result is driven by the fact that the majority of par-
ticipants are risk averse or risk neutral. Risk seeking participants instead reduce use when
facing less uncertainty. Also as predicted by the theoretical model in Chapter 2, combining
behavior driven by risk preferences with the presence of an increasing block rate structure
results in behavior that looks like consumers are targeting the block boundary. This exper-
iment shows that providing more information may not lead to reduced use without other
incentives, goal-setting, or mechanisms designed to help individuals process the information.
In Chapter 4, I empirically analyze a ten-year household-level panel data set of monthly
utility bills. A single utility provides electricity, natural gas and water services to its cus-
tomers and therefore bills through a single utility bill. I first show that price responsiveness
varies by the number and combination of services subscribed to by a given household. Sec-
ond, through a price salience model I show that households are more responsive to the price
of water when the water portion of the total bill is greater. When multiple services are
contained on a single bill, the salience of any individual price signal is dampened. This
study confirms that households are inelastic though not unresponsive to water prices. In
order to make pricing policies more e!ective, utilities need to acknowledge that households
may be responding to total utility costs (i.e., may respond to a high utility bill by reducing
iii
electricity use despite the true driver of the high bill) and will need to find ways to make
quantity and price information more salient to their customers.
Chapter 5 concludes this dissertation by summarizing the contributions of the research
and possible extensions for future work. By improving the informational environment sur-
rounding household water and energy use, there will be great capacity for households to
use water and energy more e"ciently and ultimately make choices that reduce residential
water/energy consumption and yield benefits for customers, utilities, and the environment.
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Utilities are faced with growing demand at a time when supply expansion is increasingly
costly, inconsistent, and taxing on the environment. In order to better manage this growing
gap, utilities need demand-side management programs to result in more reliable and consis-
tent consumer responsiveness. Currently, a major barrier to predictable demand response is
that most households do not have access to the type or frequency of information needed to
conserve or shift from peak to o!-peak periods. It is di"cult to get consumers to respond
to incentives if they do not receive clear signals about their use or about the prices they
face. Advanced information solutions exist, but to make the best use of these technologies
we need a better understanding of how people respond to receiving more information.
Most households do not know how much water or energy they consume (Jordan, 2011).
Two national surveys by Attari et al. (2010) and Attari (2014) reveal that households un-
derestimate energy and water use of various common household activities by a factor of 2.8
and 2, respectively. These surveys also show that most consumers do not know the most
e!ective way to reduce consumption; most participants state that reducing use of existing
technologies (e.g., turning o! lights or taking shorter showers) is more e!ective than e"ciency
improvements (e.g., installing better insulation or a low-flow toilet). The decision-making
setting contributes to this lack of understanding: households make multiple consumption
choices before ever seeing a bill. When the monthly bill arrives, it is nearly impossible to
make precise use of the quantity or price information. Since most households cannot track
their use throughout the month and only receive dated price signals, they are not able to
e"ciently or cost-e!ectively reduce their consumption. Households need to be provided with
1
regular and coherent information in order to understand the relationship between their ac-
tions, consumption and eventually their bill (List and Price, 2013).1 While this is a common
issue across both water and energy utilities, each are driven by di!erent motivating factors
and face di!erent obstacles in realizing quantifiable demand responsiveness.
Energy utilities are mainly interested in reducing what is known as “peak” demand, which
refers to both the smoothing out of demand over the course of day, and to avoiding the few
hours of highest demand in a year (coincident peak demand), which occur on particularly
cold or hot days. There are environmental benefits from reducing peak demand: utilities
can reduce fuel consumption and greenhouse gas emissions by scaling back use of peaking
power plants which are the ‘dirtier,’ more expensive power plants. Of the total energy con-
sumed in the United States, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) estimates that
approximately 39% is used to generate electricity (EPA, 2014). The U. S. Energy Informa-
tion Administration (EIA) estimates that approximately 90% of residential greenhouse gas
emissions are driven by natural gas and electricity consumption for heating, cooling, lighting,
cooking and more (EIA, 2011). In addition to reducing combustion of fossil fuels and air
pollution, lower energy demand will result in “reduced land and water use requirements for
power plants and rights-of-way for power lines” (DOE, 2012b).
Reducing peak demand also results in greater economic e"ciency as the marginal cost
of generating energy during peak demand can be up to ten times higher than non-peak
generation (Orcutt, 2010). Utilities can also avoid or at least defer the need for additional
power plant capacity, transmission facilities and delivery infrastructure. For example, 20%
participation in a demand response pricing program in Oklahoma is allowing the utility to
1List and Price (2013) argue that salience (and norms) matter most in managing the key problems
utilities face. Making consumption and its cost salient via improved feedback and information results in
increased price sensitivity and e!ectiveness of pecuniary-based policies.
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o!set its need for a new natural-gas peaking plant (DOE, 2012b). High demand during
peak periods can contribute to outages, which disrupt economic activity for customers and
the utility alike. Koomey and Brown (2002) identify three main reasons why peak times
are likely to lead to outages: First, the very nature of energy generation is that it must be
generated and delivered in tandem with when it is being demanded, i.e., it cannot e!ectively
be stored. Second, generation capacity is fixed in the short term and takes many years and
millions of dollars to build additional capacity. Finally – and most relevant to the research in
this dissertation – there is a lack of responsiveness to real-time costs. This is due, in part, to
the lack of metering technology to actually convey and charge customers real-time prices, but
also because “even when metering technologies are capable of monitoring such price signals,
sometimes the bills are delivered on a monthly basis, thus sidestepping the most powerful
potential e!ect of real-time prices, the immediate behavioral feedback” (Koomey and Brown,
2002). Pricing and behavioral programs can be more cost-e!ective means of reducing peak
demand and energy consumption overall. “We don’t need more costly power plents to fix
the psoblem. Better information and decision-making during times of peak demand could
significantly reduce generation costs and the risk of power outages” (Orcutt, 2010).
The United States Federal Government has acknowledged the above issues and taken
steps to encourage the energy industry. The Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007
outlines that the United States needs to modernize the electricity grid in order to better
control our energy use; this goal includes advancement of ‘smart grid’ technology and pro-
viding consumers with better information and tools to understand and address their energy
use.2 This Act acknowledges that ‘for the United States to realize its full demand response
potential, customers must have access to, and a better understanding of, information about
2See the website www.smartgrid.gov to learn more.
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real-time or near-real-time prices” (Congress, 2007). Given that households have very little
information and limited tools to easily manage their use, the American Recovery and Rein-
vestment Act of 2009 created the Smart Grid Investment Grant (SGIG) programs, managed
by the Department of Energy. A major objective of this part of the Recovery and Reinvest-
ment Act of 2009 is to “empower customers with information so they can better manage
their electricity consumption and costs” (DOE, 2012a).
As a result of SGIG initiatives, 65 million ‘smart’ meters will be installed by 2015, and
over $4 billion will be spent on advanced metering infrastructure (AMI). AMI systems allow
greater access to and use of real-time information; these systems create the potential for a
two-way stream of communication between utilities and customers.3 Utilities employ this
technology to detect leaks, outages and ine"ciencies, understand time-of-day consumption
patterns, and improve demand forecasts, all of which can lead to a better understanding of
consumer behavior and responsiveness to policies. A secondary use, which often lags these
initial benefits of smart meters, is communication of data back to households. Households
can access real time, or near-real time, streams of information on use, prices and total cost
through an in-home display or a web portal. We still need to know “to what extent can
AMI, coupled with time-based rate programs and enabling technologies such as in- home
displays or programmable communicating thermostats, reduce peak and overall demand for
electricity” (DOE, 2012a).
Water utilities, on the other hand, are motivated to encourage more e"cient indoor
water use and to reduce their version of ‘peak’ demand, which refers to the periods of
greatest outdoor water use during summer months. By reducing peak outdoor watering
3See the 2009 survey “Smart Metering for Utilities”, an Oracle White Paper for a thorough introduction
for the use of smart meters in utilities (Oracle, 2009).
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demand, it reduces or defers expansion of costly storage and treatment capacity. Summer
use is typically two to four times greater than winter (indoor) use, therefore utilities need to
have storage and treatment capacity for demands multiple times larger than average daily
demand. With increasingly variable precipitation patterns, utilities are searching for ways to
lower outdoor water demand; for example, cities like Los Angeles and Las Vegas are paying
residents to replace water-intensive lawns with drought resistant landscaping (Lovett, 2013).
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) documented as a result of climate
change, many regions of the United States and around the world are likely to experience
increased variability in water supplies and increasingly severe spells of heat waves and/or
drought conditions (IPCC, 2014). An EPA report highlights that between between 2007
and 2012 nearly every region in the United States has experienced water shortages, even in
the absence of drought conditions (Ferraro and Price, 2013; Peace et al., 2013). Even where
any population increases appear to be o!set by e"ciency improvements - supply variability
will be enough to introduce vulnerability. “It is clear that climate change stands to increase
national water demands and diminish national water supplies” (Averyt et al., 2013). What
exacerbates this issue is that many of the areas that are already water stressed, like the
Western and Southwestern regions of the U.S., are also the areas exhibiting the largest
population migration and growth.
Climate change is a!ecting water utilities in other ways, too. In a report by the Center
for Climate and Energy Solutions on the e!ect of climate change on water and wastewater
utilities estimate a total cost of between “$448 billion and $944 billion for infrastructure and
operations and maintenance to adapt to climate change impacts through 2050” (AMWA,
2009). This does not include cost of future regulatory controls; costs of complying with new
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regulation, especially in terms of water and wastewater treatment, is a major driver of rate
increases. See Walton (2012) for an overview of the cost-related challenges (e.g. population
growth, aging infrastructure, regulation, climate change, etc.) utilities will face in the near
future or already face today.
A 2012 report by the American Water Works Association estimates that investment needs
in major water infrastructure across the United States between 2011 and 2035 are over $1
trillion, with 75% of those costs stemming from needs in the Southern and Western regions,
which are also those facing the greatest water supply challenges (AWWA, 2012). Of this
$1 trillion, 54% is for replacement and the remainder to account for demand growth and
population migration (AWWA, 2012). The AWWA report also concludes that regardless of
the finance mechanism, these infrastructure costs will result in increased household water
rates and bills. As it is, based on the sample from the AWWA Water and Wastewater Rate
Surveys the average monthly cost of an average household level of consumption of water
(1500 cubic feet) increased 68% between 2000 and 2010 (Rahill-Marier et al., 2013). With
increasing costs and rates, the age of cheap water is coming to an end. As water supplies are
become less reliable and other infrastructure costs are set to increase drastically, achieving
predictable demand responsiveness is crucial. For both short and long-term revenue and cost
planning, utilities will need to better understand how employing demand response programs
will a!ect consumption and price responsiveness.
The value of quantifiable demand responsiveness is the avoided cost of supply; the e!ect
of a demand response program, however, is currently hard to measure. Existing evidence as
to the e!ect of demand response programs yield mixed results. These issues often stem from
poor experimental design, little e!orts to measure determinants of program participation or
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customer responses, or because the design or incentives of the program has been changed,
making it hard to track impacts over time (Kassakian and Schmalensee, 2011).4 Also, the
initial SGIG reports warn that much of AMI-related technology is very new. Even where
‘smart’ meters have been installed, only a few studies on its e!ects on consumption and
price responsiveness have been or are being completed. There is still a lot to learn about
how changing information content, frequency of information and advanced technologies can
be employed and how consumers interact with the technology; “more experience is needed
with them by power companies, customers, and vendors before their appropriate roles in
demand-side programs can be fully assessed” (DOE, 2012a). Despite the push on utilities
to install AMI, it will still be a while before utilities take advantage of the opportunities
to communicate data back to households and equip their customers with tools to more
e!ectively understand and manage their use. This study furthers the understanding of
how changing the informational environment may a!ect consumption patterns and price
responsiveness.
1.1. Overview
This dissertation consists of three essays that each address issues related to information
used by consumers in making decisions about water and energy use. The decision-making
setting is characterized by uncertainty and imperfect information.5
In this setting I investigate three deviations from a well-functioning market:
(1) Uncertainty
4For example, when a utility allows customers to “opt-in” to a demand response program, this creates
selection bias in the data. It will be hard to separate out the true e!ect of the program given that the people
who opted to participate are likely di!erent from those who did not actively seek to opt into the program.
5Other real-world applications like cell phone use, labor supply, credit card spending, health care choices,
etc. can also fit into the class of issues discussed in this dissertation.
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(2) Non-linear rate structures
(3) Combined bills
I investigate how timing of information can reduce uncertainty and a!ect consumption
choices, how the e!ect of the timing of information changes under di!erent price structures
and how a combined bill for multiple services mu#es the the price signal of any individual
service.
In this setting a consumer makes multiple consumption decisions over a period prior to
full realization of the cost by receiving a bill. While the benefits accrue immediately, the
consumer only becomes aware of the cost after all consumption decisions have been made and
they are presented an end-of-period bill. This facet contributes to the fact that consumers
make consumption choices under uncertainty. The quantity is uncertain for at least three
reasons: a) most households lack the means to track use throughout the billing period, b)
water and energy are inputs to various household activities where the exact relationship
is di"cult to know (e.g., how many gallons of water does it take to keep a lawn green)
and 3) quantity information and price signals are intermittent, unclear and confusing. Bills
are di"cult to understand, typically delivered only once a month, and water and energy
are priced in obscure units like cubic feet and kWh. Over the course of a billing period,
consumers face what I define as two separate types of quantity uncertainty: ‘backward
uncertainty,’ since it is di"cult or inconvenient to know total consumption up to any given
point in the period, and ‘forward uncertainty,’ because the household is unlikely to know how
much they will consume throughout the remainder of the period. As a result, when making
decisions within a bill period, consumers are unaware of how much they have consumed
to that point and how much they are likely to consume in total throughout the period.
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Backward uncertainty can be mitigated by improving the timing of information through
more frequent feedback than typically occurs in these settings.
The second complication in this class of decision-making settings is that consumers often
face non-linear or penalty pricing plans where total consumption in a bill period beyond a
threshold level results in a higher price or an additional fee. Due to quantity uncertainty,
the consumer is unlikely to know where they are in reference to the threshold level at any
point during the billing period. The main non-linear pricing structure focused on throughout
this dissertation is the increasing block rate structure (IBR).6 With an IBR, the per-unit
price increases as consumption increases. The first block (amount or tier) of consumption
is charged at one marginal price, all use beyond the first block boundary is charged at the
second block marginal rate, and so on and so forth.
Finally, consumers may face charges for multiple goods or services on one bill. Even
when the cost of the period of consumption decisions is realized, this price signal may be
muddled by the costs of the other services. Consumers may be responding to total cost or to
prices of other services. Even attentive customers find it unclear as to the most e"cient or
cost-e!ective way to a!ect their cost by altering behavior. This type of billing could render
demand-management policies less e!ective. Overall, it may not be correct to model consumer
price responsiveness in terms of the marginal price as in traditional economic theory if there
is potential that the consumer is unclear or unaware of the relationship between quantity
consumed and the marginal price.
Research investigating these decision-making environments is important because the in-
formation technology exists to ‘unmuddle’ prices signals and eliminate backward quantity
uncertainty. As noted above, AMI technology is increasingly being implemented. This type
6These are alternatively referred to as tiered rate structures.
9
of technology changes the manner and frequency of the information stream available to
consumers. However, there is still great uncertainty as to how this change in information
delivery will impact consumption and responsiveness to changes in prices or other demand-
management policies.
In Chapter 2, I develop an expected utility model of consumer behavior under quantity
uncertainty. An individual makes a series of consumption choices within a billing period, each
choice requiring an uncertain amount of inputs.7 In a completely uncertain environment, the
consumer never knows the input requirement of any individual choice and only learns total
input use at the end of a billing period after all decisions have been made. I then show the
e!ect on optimal choices of removing backward uncertainty by revealing previous input use
up to the current decision within the period. The model is first presented in the context of
a constant marginal price structure, then a two-tier increasing block rate structure. In the
second case, quantity uncertainty causes marginal price uncertainty, which results in di!erent
behavior across di!erent levels of quantity uncertainty than when the marginal price is known
and constant. For example, an individual who is risk neutral but faces a positive probability
of consuming in the second block (thus facing a higher marginal price) may appear to act
risk averse. Overall, the theoretical model suggests that consumer behavior depends on 1)
the level of uncertainty, which is dictated by the frequency of information provided within
a period, 2) the content of the information (i.e., the value of the input requirement), 3) the
individual’s risk preferences, and 4) the rate structure.
Chapter 3 details an economic laboratory experiment designed to test the e!ect of re-
moving backward uncertainty under linear and non-linear price structures, which is what
7For example, consider a household that sets the thermostat at a certain temperature. They will not
know how many kWh of electricity this choice requires. With a smart meter in-home display, the household
would better understand this relationship and be able track cost and energy use throughout a billing period.
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is explored theoretically in Chapter 2. Like the theoretical model, the experimental setting
is simplified to an individual making consumption choices under quantity uncertainty due
to imperfect information. In the computerized laboratory experiment, participants make
a series of decisions facing either complete uncertainty or only forward uncertainty if the
individual receives feedback on her use resulting from previous decisions within the period.
The feedback e!ect is tested under three rate structure treatments: a constant marginal
price structure and two versions of a two-tier increasing block rate structure. Results show
that providing quantity information that reduces uncertainty increases consumption levels,
on average. This suggests that advanced metering technology, without goal-setting or other
mechanisms in place, may not have the desired e!ect of inducing peak-demand shifting or
conservation.
Chapter 4 contains an empirical analysis of how combined energy and water utility bills
a!ect water consumption patterns and price responsiveness. As noted above, when multiple
services are billed through a single monthly bill, the price signal of any single service is likely
to be less salient to the consumer. Even when the cost of a billing period’s consumption is
realized, a given service’s price signal may be muddled by the costs of the other services.
This analysis is made possible by a novel data set that includes billing and consumption
information for water, electricity and natural gas for a large number of households across
nearly a decade. A single utility provides all three services and also bills for all three services
through a single monthly bill. I create a model that tests the salience of the water price
signal, given that water is billed along with electricity and natural gas within a single bill.
I allow the responsiveness of price to vary by the weight of the water portion of the bill
relative to the total utility bill. I find that household water demand is price-inelastic, but
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households pay relatively more attention to water prices when their water use contributes
to a greater portion of their total utility spending. However, for this population, during the
months when water expenditures are increasing and price responsiveness is increasing, total
utility bills tend to decrease overall. As a result, these two observations provide additional
evidence supporting the notion that household demand for water is generally price-inelastic,
but not unresponsive, with respect to water prices.
Finally, Chapter 5 concludes with a discussion highlighting the contributions of this
research and the implications for the changing informational setting surrounding water and
energy use. Simply assuming that ‘more information is better’ may lead to more consumption
as well as less happy and less attentive customers. Information needs to be easy to access and
understand. Along with well designed information streams, consumers need the correct tools




A Theory of Consumer Decision-making under
Uncertainty
2.1. Introduction
In this chapter I develop a theoretical model of individual decision-making under uncer-
tainty; the decision setting is designed to incorporate the key aspects of household water
and energy consumption as described in the introductory chapter: The individual consumer
makes multiple consumption decisions about a good over a period of time prior to full real-
ization of the cost. While the benefits accrue immediately, the consumer only becomes aware
of the cost after all consumption decisions have been made when they are presented with an
end-of-period bill that reflects the cost of total consumption over the period. Consumption
of the good requires an unknown quantity of inputs. For example, consider a household that
sets its thermostat at a certain temperature. The household will not know how many kWh
of electricity this choice requires; this uncertainty will be due in part to weather variation
and in part to the inability of the household to track consumption or attribute electricity
consumption specifically to temperature settings. This consumer faces two types of quan-
tity uncertainty: forward and backward. Forward uncertainty refers to a lack of knowledge
of future consumption, based on the inherent uncertainty of future needs and conditions.
Backward uncertainty occurs because it is often impossible or inconvenient to keep track of
previous consumption within the period. As a result, when making decisions within a bill
period, the consumer is unaware of how much they have consumed up to that point and how
much they are likely to consume, in total, throughout the period. As such, in the case of
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setting the thermostat, the household will not know how many kilowatt-hours of electricity
this choice has consumed at any given point in the bill period, and the household will not
know how much more electricity will be consumed by the end of the billing period. Back-
ward uncertainty can be mitigated by improving the timing of information through more
frequent feedback than typically occurs in these settings. This chapter develops a model of
how removing backward uncertainty a!ects total consumption and intra-period consumption
choices across two common pricing structures.
In a completely uncertain environment, the consumer never knows the input requirement
of any individual choice and only learns total input use at the end of a billing period after all
decisions have been made. If the individual instead only faces forward quantity uncertainty,
then she has information about the input requirements of each individual choice after that
specific choice has been made. At any decision point in the billing period, she will know
how much she has consumed up to that point, but will still be uncertain of how much she
will consume in the remainder of the period. In the model, I illustrate the e!ect on optimal
choices of removing backward uncertainty by revealing previous input use up to the current
decision within the period. The e!ect of uncertainty depends on the risk preferences of the
consumer and the nature of the price structure they face. I model the e!ect for three types
of risk preferences: risk averse, risk neutral and risk seeking. The model is first presented in
the context of a constant marginal price structure (CMP), then a two-tier increasing block
rate structure (IBR). In the second case, quantity uncertainty causes the consumer to be
uncertain as to which marginal price they face, and removing backward uncertainty will have
a di!erent e!ect on the behavior. Overall, optimal behavior is found to depend on the level of
quantity uncertainty (i.e., the frequency of feedback and the true realization of the uncertain
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input requirements), risk preferences, and the rate structure. I develop a number of testable
predictions from the theoretical framework, which I investigate using data generated from a
computerized laboratory experiment discussed in Chapter 3.
Modeling decision-making under uncertainty is not a new endeavor. This model di!ers
from those in the existing literature in a few notable ways. First, I model multiple, sequential
choices within a billing period. Existing models do not capture this aspect of the decision-
making environment; instead they essentially model the billing period as the unit of decision-
making, even in models of sequential decision-making under uncertainty (Sandmo, 1974; Ito,
2014). Without incorporating this aspect, we cannot separate out the e!ect of backward
uncertainty. In household water and energy use, many choices are made within the billing
period. When the household only receives an end-of-period bill, they make all of the period’s
decisions before any uncertainty is realized. Even when the uncertainty is realized, the
multiple-choice nature of the environment keeps the individual from knowing the true values
of individual input requirement.
Second, I allow for a spectrum of risk preferences. Other models, typically via their
choice of functional form, assume the individual is risk averse or risk neutral (Ito, 2014).
Without allowing for many types of risk preferences, we would not be able to illustrate the
variety of possible sets of choices made with and without uncertainty, especially when facing
a non-linear rate structure. While this theoretical model is designed to illustrate how more
frequent feedback may influence household water and energy use, the findings here can also
be applied to any other setting where multiple decisions are made facing uncertainty and are
made prior to realization of cost.
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The next section provides background and a discussion of related decision-making models.
I first introduce utility theory and expected utility theory. Then, I briefly survey some other
models that provided guidance on construction of the model and how levels of risk and
information might be expected to influence the individuals decisions. I then discuss the IBR
structure, which presents some challenging mathematical and conceptual complications.
2.2. Literature Review
Utility theory (UT) is the traditional approach to consumer choice theory. It assumes
a rational decision-maker whose preferences are complete and transitive. An assumption
embedded in UT that the consumers preference relationships are continuous, which allows
the preferences to be represented through a utility function. Uncertainty is one of the
main characteristics of the economic settings of interest in this dissertation. As compared
to a certain decision-making environment, uncertain outcomes lead to di!erent consumption
decisions; changes in the level uncertainty will a!ect consumption decisions. Expected utility
theory is the extension of UT that describes behavior where the individual makes choices
under uncertain outcomes.
2.2.1. Expected Utility Theory
The expected utility model combines decision theory with probability theory and is used
to explain decision-making under uncertainty. Expected utility is equal to the sum of each
outcomes utility multiplied by its associated probability:E[U ] =
!
i(Uipi), where i = 1...n
refer to the possible outcomes, so Ui and pi refer to the utility and probability of that
outcome.
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It is assumed that an individual will make the choice that maximizes her expected utility,
given her preferences. This is known as an axiomatic approach, where the researcher assumes
certain conditions about the decision-makers preference structure, then uses the model to
examine how the individual makes choices in the setting of interest. EUT is analytically
convenient and provides normative results, which can serve as a guide in decision-making.
In Chapter 3, I use the EUT models developed in this chapter to predict behavior in a
laboratory experiment involving uncertainty.
Individuals with di!erent risk preferences will respond di!erently to uncertainty; I use
Jensens Inequality to show this. For example, Jensens Inequality shows that if an individual
is risk averse, it is equivalent to the assuming the utility function is convex; the expected
utility of a choice is less than the utility of the expected outcome of that choice. When
uncertainty is present, a risk averse individual will underconsume relative to the risk neutral
individual, who will under-consume relative to the risk seeking individual. For a thorough
introduction to the concept of risk see Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970, 1971); they discuss the
e!ect of risk on expectations and on economic decisions under uncertainty. Studies in this
area typically assume one type of risk preference: often risk averse or risk neutral individual.
I avoid this constraining assumption, leaving it to empirical research to confirm the type(s) of
risk preferences of the individuals in the particular sample. I use risk preferences to illustrate
how removal of backward uncertainty could possibly influence a variety of decision-makers.
Much of the theoretical literature on decision-making focuses on one of the following con-
texts: (i) capital investment models, where the firm makes capital or labor investment choices
under demand or price uncertainty (e.g. Nickell (1977)), (ii) labor-leisure models where the
individual makes choices under income or employment uncertainty (Burdett and Mortensen,
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1978), or (iii) consumption-savings models where the individual makes consumption, savings
and borrowing choices under a variety of economic uncertainties (Epstein, 1980; Hahm and
Steigerwald, 1999). A common environmental application is climate change, where the gov-
ernment must choose a policy given uncertainty on how will emissions today impact humans
in the future (Arrow and Fisher, 1974). The type of uncertainty involved in the bulk of the
literature is typically a form of price or cost uncertainty.
The nature of my problem of interest does not exactly stem from any of these uncer-
tainties, therefore requires a di!erent treatment. There is no inherent uncertainty in the
price of the input or in how much income the individual has over the course of the period
of decisions. The nature of the uncertainty is input requirement uncertainty a quantity
uncertainty. While this quantity uncertainty causes input cost uncertainty, modeling the
setting only as cost uncertainty would not allow complete analysis of the e!ect of provid-
ing information on quantity use. Quantity uncertainty is not modeled often since it is not
common for an individual to not know this information.
Production theory models have provided the most insight, as the individual in my set-
tings can be thought of producing something that provides a known utility but requires an
unknown amount of inputs. Leland (1972) provides a model of production under demand
uncertainty, using Jensens Inequality to reach the same results as I do in relation to how
risk preferences will a!ect output choices: The principle of increasing uncertainty implies
the risk averse firm will produce less than it would under certainty If follows that optimal
output of the risk preferring firm will be larger under un-certainty than under certainty. Risk
neutrality implies uncertainty will not a!ect the firm’s output. Coes (1977) provide proof of
how increasing demand uncertainty will reduce the optimal level of output if absolute risk
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aversion is non-increasing. Therefore, if demand uncertainty is reduced, the optimal output
level will be relatively higher.
Strong and Goemans (forthcoming) also use this literature and provides a quantity uncer-
tainty model that will serve as the foundation for the model in this paper. Their application
is to household water use and the e!ect of a device which communicates real-time water
consumption information to the households. They model quantity uncertainty, but also in-
corporate consumer perceptions about the quantity they consume. They find that the e!ect
of providing more information (reducing quantity uncertainty) will depend on risk prefer-
ences, but also how these risk preferences interact with household bias and the rate structure.
Strong and Goemans model consumption for the entire billing period as the choice variable.
As such, one notable way that I extend this model is to allow for multiple decisions within
a billing period, which is used to show the e!ect of backward uncertainty.
2.2.2. Modeling Sequential Decisions
Most models with a chronological component are two or three period models that aim
to theoretically show optimal rational behavior under uncertainty over time. See Sandmo
(1974) for an early review of two-period consumption models under uncertainty and my
list above for the common contexts of these models. They focus on how increasing uncer-
tainty (like Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970, 1971) concept of increasing risk), along with the
other parameters of the model a!ects the optimal level of investment, labor, consumption
or emissions. Most discuss the relationship between the first-period decision and flexibility
in available options in later periods. The literature also focused on how the optimal choices
change if the uncertainty is expected to be resolved or reduced over time, as discussed above.
They show that if the individual is expecting to gain information in the future about the
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uncertain variable she will make more conservative choices today to preserve some flexibility
in taking advantage of the information later.
For example, in the theoretical literature on optimal capital investment or portfolio in-
vestment under uncertainty, Jones and Ostroy (1984) show that investment will be lower
earlier if there are expectations to gain information in the future. Demers (1991) shows sim-
ilar implications, though in this literature the investment decisions often contain a degree
of irreversibility in that earlier choices may lock in or constrain the individual to a smaller
set of options in the future. Individuals may be more even more cautious when mistakes are
costly; this implies that we may see individuals being more conservative when prices or costs
are higher (Demers, 1991). The expectation of more information in the future implies more
risk now (Epstein and Zin, 1989). Similarly, Sandmo (1970) shows this too in consumption-
savings models: increased uncertainty about future income decreases consumption today,
which means increased savings today. These results are more applicable to decisions re-
garding consumers initial decisions about health care plans or cell phones plans, while my
analysis focuses on the within-billing period decisions made after this choice. Still the role
of expecting to have feedback is important: it suggests that our individuals may be more
conservative in their consumption earlier on in the billing period if they expect to be able
to learn more about how their choices impact their net utility. More recently, Baker (2006)
finds that when the payo! function is separable in the random variable, that and increase
in informativeness may have a similar e!ect on first period decision-making as when there
is an increase in uncertainty. All of these studies indicate that risk attitude does not a!ect
the qualitative e!ects of information.
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Overall, these models could be employed to model the aggregate consumption decision,
but it is the intra-period decisions under di!erent levels of uncertainty that is of interest
and, to my knowledge, has not been modeled yet. Antle (1983) highlights the importance of
modeling the intra-period decisions in a farming context. Because farm managers can be ex-
pected to utilize all available information in decision making, they will feed back information
from earlier production stages to later input choices. Only modeling the final consumption
totals will not be able to show the impact of removing backward uncertainty. Two indi-
viduals, one with and one without backward uncertainty, could theoretically have the same
total consumption in a period, but the intra-period decisions will be di!erent: the consumer
without feedback will choose the same quantity each time, whereas the other consumer will
alter her choices in reaction to the feedback and the information it provides.
A final note on the literature of sequential decision-making is the use of discounting over
time. This is typically appropriate for a temporal model, but I argue it is not necessary in my
model because a month is the common time frame of a billing period in my settings; a month
is not a su"cient enough amount of time for discounting to significantly a!ect decisions.
2.2.3. Incorporating Non-linear Price Structures
The EUT model is typically constructed with reference to a linear budget constraint, but
this is often not the case for my class of economic problems. For example, water, electricity,
cell phone minutes and data use, and labor supply are all decisions made while facing a non-
linear price structure. Non-linear budget constraints create mathematical and conceptual
complexities in the EUT framework.
Ignoring uncertainty for a moment, a non-linear price structure complicates the modeling
of consumer decisions because the individual now faces a non-linear budget constraint. For
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the IBR case, this is called a piece-wise or a kinked budget set. Typically, a utility maximizing
consumer chooses the quantity where the utility indi!erence curve is tangent to the linear
budget constraint. This is a unique, global maximum. However, an IBR creates a piece-wise
convex budget constraint where the tangency point may occur within a block or at a kink
point. Deriving the demand functions from the utility theory is no longer straightforward.
Also, the traditional comparative statics embodied in price and income e!ects may be zero
instead of negative and positive, respectively (Mo"tt, 1986).
Theoretically, the non-linearity issue is addressed by first determining quantity demanded
conditional on the choice of block or the kink point. This conditional demand is described
using the indirect utility function. Then, given each of these indirect utilities, the consumer
chooses whichever level of consumption within the optimal block yields the highest utility.
Utility maximization will only occur at a kink point if the utility maxima along the kinks
neighboring blocks occur in the infeasible range of both block segments. Mo"tt (1986, 1990)
provides the early work on the modeling of non-linear kinked budget constraints. Hanemann
(1984) and Hewitt and Hanemann (1995) also provide similar theoretical models for non-
linear budget constraints with applications to water demand. Olmstead et al. (2007) math-
ematically show the di!erence in price elasticities under and IBR versus a CMP structure.
Price elasticity of demand under increasing block prices is more complex because it involves
a secondary income e!ect that results from infra-marginal price changes. They also rea"rm
the interest in these issues since non-linear prices dominate in markets for many goods and
services other than water, including electricity, local and wireless telephone services, and
labor supply under progressive income taxation.
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Econometrically, when inputs are priced according to an IBR structure, marginal price
and total input use are co-determined. Using a traditional demand estimation technique will
have a significant endogeneity problem, leading to biased and inconsistent estimators and
results. Burtless and Hausman (1978) first mobilized a solution in the context of estimating
elasticities under non-linear prices (taxes) when estimating labor supply (number of hours
worked and net marginal wage are jointly determined). The problem has been described as
the consumer first making a discrete choice then making a continuous choice. In addition
to the labor supply/income tax case above, examples include whether to buy or rent a
home, then how large of a home to live in; what vehicle to buy, then how much to use
it. The idea is that the two choices ought to be modeled together since the discrete and
the continuous choice partly depend on the other. The developments in utility theory under
non-linear prices and the empirical struggles lead to the currently still dominant econometric
counterpart: the discrete-continuous choice model. The discrete/continuous choice (DCC)
is an econometric model Hanemann (1984) provides the first unified DCC model derived
from utility theoretic underpinnings. His paper first models the choice of which block to
consume in, then how much water to consumer within that block. However, this model is
used for empirical estimate to address the issue of jointly determined marginal price and
quantity consumed. This model, while it address the non-linear rate structure, does not
include uncertainty. It assumes that households are fully informed, which as described in
Chapter 1, is likely not the case.
2.2.4. Alternatives to EUT with non-linear prices
Decision-making under uncertainty with non-linear rate structures (with multiple possible
marginal prices) has motivated a literature surrounding what price signal consumers are
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actually aware of and respond to. The evidence provided by empirical literature suggests that
there is a degree of uncertainty surrounding prices in addition to the quantity uncertainty
discussed above. Some studies suggest that consumers may respond to an average price
rather than the correct marginal price in cases of complicated price structures (Shin, 1985).
Borenstein (2009) models consumers as setting behavioral rules prior to the start of the
period, optimizing given a distribution of exogenous demand shocks. Bushnell and Mansur
(2005) show that customers are more responsive to price signals from the previous bill than
to current conditions. Behavioral economists, borrowing from psychology, argue that there is
a limit to rationality and cognitive ability. Individuals are more likely to use heuristics or be
myopic in making their decisions in complex situations rather than behave like the rational
‘homo-economicus.’ Liebman and Zeckhauser (2004) coined the term “schmeduling” as a
descriptor of an individual who is inaccurately perceiving the price schedule, and further
define two varieties: ironing and spotlighting. Ironing is in line with consumers focusing
on average prices, whereas spotlighting is in line with the myopia literature. For the sake
of focusing on the role of quantity uncertainty, I assume that the consumer knows the rate
structure and the price parameters perfectly. I address some of these behavioral issues in
the empirical study found in Chapter 4 of this dissertation.
2.2.5. Summary
No existing model in the literature is wholly appropriate to model this decision-making
environment. Recall that in order to capture the issues of interest, a model needs the
following features: quantity uncertainty, intra-period level sequential decisions, and ability
to incorporate non-linear price structures. In the existing literature, most uncertainty is
modeled as a type of price uncertainty and/or focuses on how uncertainty a!ects irreversible
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decisions. Existing sequential decision models assume a longer time frame and therefore use a
discount rate. Plus most of these studies set up the framework such that first-period decisions
are made with complete certainty in first-period information, but only with uncertainty in
future periods. Most also assume a risk averse representative agent. Finally, models that do
look at consumption under non-linear prices may not incorporate uncertainty and typically
only consider one-shot consumption choices instead of sequential decisions.
The next section begins the theoretical model, which is an extension of the model found
in Strong and Goemans (forthcoming). I start with the case where the individual faces a
constant marginal price structure.
2.3. Theoretical Model
2.3.1. Case 1: Constant Marginal Price
Consider a model where an individual makes consumption choices about two goods, x and
z, over a period of time. Utility from x and z are additively separable where u(x) and v(z)
denote the sub-utility functions. Also assume that u(x), v(z) are both continuous and twice
di!erentiable. The period consists of S sub-periods, and the consumer makes S sequential
consumption choices about how much x to consume where xs denotes the quantity chosen
at sub-period time s. Total consumption, x, in a period is the sum of all sub-period choices
such that x =
!S
s=1 xs. It is assumed that all remaining income in a period is spent on z,
the composite numeraire good.
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Consumption of xs requires the use of an input ws. The number of inputs required for
consumption depends on a random input requirement rs ! (r̄, !) such that xsrs = ws.8
Define f(ws|xs, rs) as the probability density function such that E[ws] = xsE[rs] = xsr̄, and
ws ! (xsr̄, x2s!). The total cost of consumption, C(x), is determined by the total amount of
inputs used throughout the period. Let p be the marginal price of w and I denote income
for the period.9 Assuming the individual exhausts all of her income in a period, the budget
constraint holds with equality: I = p
!S
s=1 ws+ z, where the price of z is normalized to one.
The consumer knows, with certainty, the utility gained from consuming x as well as the
marginal price of w, but the input requirement rs is not known to the individual prior to
making the consumption choice xs; as such, ws and the resulting cost of consumption is not
known prior to choosing xs either. In a given period, the individual faces one of two settings:
(1) both backward and forward uncertainty (complete uncertainty), or (2) only forward
uncertainty. Under complete uncertainty, the individual only receives an end-of-period bill
containing the total cost after all consumption choices have been made. As a result, the
individual never knows the individual realizations of the input requirements r1, r2...rS, and
only learns her total input use w after all quantity choices have been made. In Setting (2), the
consumer receives feedback on the previous decision’s input requirement rs!1, and an up-to-
date input use total
!s!1
1 ws after each choice within the period (i.e., before making choice
xs), in addition to the end-of-period bill containing w. Providing this information eliminates
8Let g(r1, r2...rS) be the pdf, where the probabilities are the same but independent across random input
requirements. Assume this pdf is symmetric around some mean. Also, note that only positive values of ws
make sense, and as such
0"
!"
f(ws|xs, rs)dws = 0
9Assume all prices are exogenously set. For utility services, this assumption is reasonable. First, most
utilities’ costs are fixed costs. They determine revenue needs and expected total demand, then work back-
wards to set variable (dependent on quantity) pricing structures that will result in the required revenue.
Many utilities are also restricted to act as a non-profit entity. It is therefore reasonable to assume that an
individual utility customer does not have any influence on prices.
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backward uncertainty since the individual knows how previous consumption choices within
the period have impacted her remaining income and, in turn, the potential utility to be
gained from consumption of the composite good z.
To illustrate the e!ect of removing backward uncertainty, consider a single billing period
consisting of two sub-periods (S = 2). The consumer’s optimization problem under complete
uncertainty is to maximize expected utility subject to a budget constraint:
Max
{x1,x2,z}




Let xcu1 and x
cu
2 denote the optimal choices under complete uncertainty; the first-order
conditions shown in Equations 2a and 2b identify that the individual optimizes by equating
the marginal utility of consumption with the expected marginal cost. The marginal cost of
consumption is essentially the marginal impact to residual income to be spent on z, seen



























If the individual gets feedback on the resulting input use w1 from the first consumption
decision x1, then this removes backward uncertainty. For now, assume, that the individual
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learns that the realized value of the input requirement r̃1 is r. Without backward uncer-
tainty, Equation 2b is modified to reflect that the optimal xfu2 choice is made facing forward





2 ) = pr2
"$
0
vz(I " p(xcu1 r̃1 + x2r2))f(r2)dr2(3)
The di!erence between the second sub-period choice under complete uncertainty versus
only forward uncertainty will depend on the individual’s risk preferences. Mathematically,
risk preferences are reflected by the curvature of the utility function. If the individual is risk
averse in numeraire (z) consumption, then the utility function v(z) is concave. Risk neu-
trality implies linear utility in the numeraire good and a constant second derivative. Risk
seeking implies a convex numeraire utility function. Proposition 1 summarizes the predic-
tions for behavior, given risk preferences.
Proposition 1: If the individual is risk averse and r̃1 = r, then x
fu
2 # xcu2 . If the consumer
is risk neutral, then xfu2 = x
cu
2 . Finally, if the consumer is risk seeking, then x
fu
2 $ xcu2 . 11
10Note that this framework, as is, suggests that the first sub-period choice will be identical regardless of
whether or not the individual will have access to feedback throughout the period. The literature on precau-
tionary savings argues that simply knowing that feedback will be available e!ectively reduces uncertainty
(see Gollier and Brunak, 2001). As such, with less uncertainty, there is less need for “precautionary savings”
and first sub-period output choice will, all else equal, be larger. This is only for individuals who are risk
averse and the third derivative of the utility function is positive. There is some evidence of this in the
week-to-week results in Section 3.4.3, but a specific investigation is left for future research.




2 for the risk averse individual and
xfu2 < x
cu
2 for the risk seeking individual.
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Proof of Proposition 1: Recall Equations 2b, and 3 that identified the optimal sub-period




















2 ) = pr2
"$
0
vz(I " p(xcu1 r̃1 + x2r2))f(r2)dr2
If the realized value r̃1 = r, then, by Jensen’s Inequality the following are true:
For a risk averse individual:
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For a risk neutral individual:
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For a risk seeking individual:
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The true value of r1 will not always be r. While Proposition 1 illustrates the base e!ect
of removing backward uncertainty through feedback, this e!ect will be exacerbated, muted
or indeterminate, depending on the true value of r1 communicated through the feedback.
As an example, consider a risk averse individual. Without feedback, she will be conservative
in her x2 choice and under-consume relative to a more certain world. The base e!ect of
removing backward uncertainty will reduce some uncertainty in her optimization problem,
and will result in a relatively larger x2 choice (i.e., x
fu
2 # xcu2 ). If she learns that the true
value of r1 is less than r, then this will induce an even larger increase in consumption in the
second sub-period. However, if she learns that the true value of r1 is greater than r, then
the overall e!ect on her optimal x2 choice is indeterminate: The reduction in uncertainty is
predicted to increase consumption, but the knowledge that her x1 choice used more inputs
than expected is predicted to reduce her consumption. The overall e!ect would require more
specific information about her utility function. Table 2.1 summarizes the e!ect of providing
feedback (removing backward uncertainty) on the optimal x2 choice for each type of risk
preferences and each possible realization of r1.
12
12These results are di!erent from the previous literature of 1-period models, like Strong and Goemans
(forthcoming). Here, by looking at sequential decisions within a billing period, I explicitly model the fact
that risk preferences and the value of the information matters. For example, a risk averse individual who
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Table 2.1. Constant Marginal Price Theoretical Results
Optimal x2 Choices: Complete Uncertainty vs. Forward Uncertainty
Realized Value r̃1
Risk Preference r1 < r r1 = r r1 > r




2 # xcu2 x
fu
2 " xcu2







Risk Seeking xfu2 " xcu2 xfu2 $ xcu2 xfu2 < xcu2
These lead to a number of testable hypotheses about behavior with and without backward
uncertainty. For example, programs that increase the frequency of delivery of quantity
information to their customers will tend to increase use if the targeted population is risk
averse.
2.3.2. Case 2: Increasing Block Rate
Now consider the case where the individual faces a non-linear input price structure,
specifically a two-tier increasing block rate structure. Let p1 be the marginal price for all
inputs used up to the block boundary B, and p2 be the marginal price for all input units
used beyond B, where p1 < p2.
13 The individual maximizes expected utility subject to a
piece-wise budget constraint:
learns that input requirements were less than expected could appear to behave the same as a risk seeking
individual who learns that input requirements are greater than expected. In a 1-period framework these two
observations would look identical, but in the theoretical framework presented here, the risk preference e!ect
is disentangled from the e!ect of the nature of the information (realized value of uncertain values).
13Note that when p1 = p2, it is a degenerate block rate structure which is simply the CMP case. In many
instances there is also a fixed cost that is independent of quantity consumed. For example: a connection fee
or a flat cost-of-service charge. The focus of this model is to show how the consumer responds to feedback in
terms of quantity, thus only the terms that are a function of quantity are of interest here. Adding a constant










s ws + z if
!2
s ws $ B
I = p1B + p2(
!S
s ws " B) + z if
!2
s ws > B
(4)
If the individual consumes w = B, she faces the unit price p1 and this point on the
budget line is called the kink point. The maximization problem is similar to the CMP case,
but now contains three terms reflecting two marginal prices: one for input use up to block
boundary B, and one for any inputs used beyond B. The individual faces the possibility that
her total input demand may be less than or greater than the block boundary, and therefore
that the marginal price may be p1 or p2. Note, when substituting for z, z is replaced with





















The first-order equations (Equations 6) identify the optimal xcu1 and x
cu
2 choices where
marginal utility is equal to the expected marginal cost, which is that impact on remaining
income to be spent on z at the end of the period. The right-hand side consists of two terms,
where the first term reflects the probability of the consumption falling within the first block

















































As in the CMP case, learning the true value of r1 removes backward uncertainty and
reduces the uncertainty faced in making the x2 choice. Similarly to the CMP case, first
assume that the individual learns that r1 does indeed equal r. The first-order condition
with respect to x2 is now made facing forward uncertainty only, where x
fu
2 is the optimal
choice in this case. Equation 7 is Equation 6b modified to reflect the removal of uncertainty












vz(I " p1B + p2((xcu1 r + x2r2)" B)f(w2)dw2
(7)
The di!erence between the second sub-period choice with complete uncertainty (xcu2 ) and
only forward uncertainty (xfu2 ) will depend not only on the individual’s risk preferences, but
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also if she expects her total input use W to be less than or greater than the block boundary
B.
Compared to facing a CMP rate structure, quantity uncertainty under an IBR structure
will lead to uncertainty surrounding the marginal price. The individual expecting to be in the
first block will face some positive probability of input demand actually exceeding the block
boundary and facing the higher marginal price. This possibility induces behavior similar to
risk aversion for those expecting to be in block 1, as the expected cost of over-consuming
is greater than the expected cost of under-consuming. The individual expecting total input
use to fall in the second block instead faces a positive probability that her total input use is
actually less than B and that she will not face the higher marginal price at all. This case
induces behavior similar to risk seeking, and here the expected cost of under-consuming is
greater than the expected cost of over-consuming. I refer to these as ‘induced’ risk behaviors,
because they are not true preferences, but the block rate may make an individual appear to
behave as if they are risk averse or seeking. The induced risk behavior is independent of the
individual’s true risk preferences over z consumption.
Proposition 2: If r1 = r, the individual is risk neutral, and expectsW $ B, then xfu2 # xcu2 .
If the same individual instead expects W > B, then xfu2 $ xcu2 . 14
Proof of Proposition 2: Note that p = p1 and p1 < p2, and recall that for a risk neutral
individual, the first derivative of the sub-utility function is a constant vz(z) = vz. Then,
the first-order equations 6b, and 7, which identify the optimal sub-period 2 choices under




2 for the individual expecting W $ B and
xfu2 < x
cu
2 for the individual expecting W > B.
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complete uncertainty and only forward uncertainty, xcu2 and x
fu
2 , for the individual facing an



























If the individual expects W $ B, then she expects that xcu1 r < B.
In the Complete Uncertainty case, w > B if w1 > B, w2 > B, or if both w1, w2 < B
but w1 + w2 > B. Formally, the probability that w = w1 + w2 > B is as follows:













However, in the applicable Forward Uncertainty only case, w > B only if w2 > B
or if w2 < B but is large enough such that w1 + w2 > B.
15 Formally:







Comparing these two probabilities, it is clear that:
Prob(w1 + w2 > B|cu) > Prob(w1 + w2 > B|fu)
15I say applicable because if the individual learns that w1 > B then this portion of the proposition no
longer applies to this individual. This proposition only applies if the realized value w1 is indeed less than B.
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Necessarily,
Prob(w1 + w2 $ B|cu) < Prob(w1 + w2 $ B|fu)

































And the individual appears to be risk averse.
If the individual expects W > B
In the Complete Uncertainty case, w $ B only if w1 + w2 $ B. Formally, the
probability that w = w1 + w2 $ B is as follows:







Under the Forward Uncertainty only case, w1 + w2 $ B only if w2 $ B " w1.
Formally:




Comparing these two probabilities it is clear that:
Prob(w1 + w2 $ B|cu) > Prob(w1 + w2 $ B|fu)
Necessarily,
Prob(w1 + w2 > B|cu) < Prob(w1 + w2 > B|fu)


































2 ) # ux2(xcu1 , xcu2 )
xfu2 $ xcu2
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And the individual appears to be risk seeking. !
However, the true value of r1 may not be r and the e!ect of reducing uncertainty on
behavior will be dampened or exacerbated, depending on the true value. For example,
consider a risk neutral individual. If she expects to W $ B, and learns that r1 < r then
xfu2 > x
cu
2 , but if she learns that r1 > r, the overall impact of the information is ambiguous:
xfu2 " xcu2 . Reducing uncertainty increases consumption, but the true value of r1 reduces
consumption. As such, the resulting xfu2 depends on the relative strengths of these two
forces. Table 2.2 organizes all possible combinations of risk preferences and learned values
of r1 for an individual expecting to total input consumption W to be in block 1 and block
2, respectively.
Table 2.2. Increasing Block Rate Theoretical Results
Optimal x2 Choices: Complete Uncertainty vs. Forward Uncertainty
Individual expects W $ B
Value of r1
Risk Preference r1 < r r1 = r r1 > r













2 # xcu2 x
fu
2 " xcu2
Risk Seeking xfu2 # xcu2 x
fu
2 " xcu2 xfu2 $ xcu2
Individual expects W > B
Value of r1
Risk Preference r1 < r r1 = r r1 > r
Risk Averse xfu2 # xcu2 x
fu
2 " xcu2 xfu2 $ xcu2
Risk Neutral xfu2 " xcu2 xfu2 $ xcu2 xfu2 < xcu2










2.3.3. CMP vs. IBR
It is di"cult to assess all of the di!erences between consumption decisions made when
facing a CMP versus an IBR structure without assuming specific parameters or functional
forms. Nevertheless, there are a few observations that can be made within this general the-
oretical framework. Set the marginal price of the first block to be equal to the price under




2 denote the optimal sub-period choices
under complete uncertainty, within the CMP rate structure. Depending on risk preferences,
and on where expected input use is relative to the block boundary, optimal consumption
facing an IBR will di!er from that of the individual facing the CMP.
Proposition 3: If wcu,CMP $ B and the individual is risk neutral, then xcu,CMPs #
xcu,IBRs , %s & S. If the individual is risk averse, then xcu,CMPs > xcu,IBRs , %s & S, where
this xcu,IBRs is less than the optimal x
cu,IBR
s choice for the risk neutral individual. If the in-
dividual is risk seeking, then the relationship between xcu,CMPs and x
cu,IBR
s is indeterminable.
These results follow from Proposition 2 and Jensen’s Inequality. These results are important
because under complete uncertainty, an IBR will result in greater overall ‘conservation’ than
what occurs when consumers face a CMP due to changes in the marginal price and an
income e!ect. Proof of Proposition 3: Note that p = p1 and p1 < p2, and recall that
for a risk neutral individual, the first derivative of the sub-utility function is a constant



















































































For the risk averse individual whose xcu,CMP $ B, Proposition 1 showed that, all
else equal, the level of x for a risk averse individual facing complete uncertainty
will be less than what a risk neutral individual facing CMP would choose under






where ‘rn’ denotes risk neutral, and ‘ra’ denotes risk averse. !
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For the individual whose expected total input use under the CMP structure is above
the block boundary, optimal consumption will decrease, but the magnitude of the di!erence
between xcu,CMP1 and x
cu,IBR
1 will depend on risk preferences and the di!erential between
the IBR marginal prices. For example, imagine an individual whose input demand under
CMP would be greater than the block boundary of the IBR. The higher marginal price of the
second block will necessarily reduce consumption, relative to the CMP optimal consumption.
However, the optimal consumption under IBR may fall to the kink point or remain in block
2, depending on the parameters of her preferences and the rate structures. Comparing
optimal behavior with and without backward uncertainty across the two rate structures gets
increasingly complicated as decisions now further depends on the realization of the random
input requirements. As such, these specifics are not included in this paper.
Overall, the theoretical model suggests that consumer behavior depends on 1) the level of
uncertainty, which is dictated by the frequency of information provided within a period, 2)
the content of the information (i.e., the value of the input requirement), 3) the individual’s
risk preferences and 4) the rate structure. This model highlights the role that backward
uncertainty plays when multiple decisions are made within a single billing period. Also,
allowing for a spectrum of risk preferences opens up the possibility for heterogeneity in the
responses to reduced quantity uncertainty. The predictions outlined in the propositions lead
to a number of testable questions, which are empirically examined through an experiment
described in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 3
An Experimental Analysis of the Effect of
Information on Consumption under Uncertainty
There are several commonplace instances where consumption choices are made under
some kind of uncertainty. Water and energy consumption are two commonplace instances
where the consumption choices are made under some kind of uncertainty. As described in
Chapter 1, this is because quantity and price information is often only (if ever) learned ex-
post consumption on an end-of-period bill. It has been found that the traditional [household
energy] billing system is inadequate for e!ective consumer decision-making: the average
monthly bill lacks “the detail which would make sense of the bill and allow for e!ective
experiments in reducing it: Consider groceries in a hypothetical store totally without price
markings, billed via a monthly statement like ‘US$527 for 2362 food units in April’. How
could grocery shoppers economize under such a billing regime?” (Kempton and Layne, 1994).
While there has been a focus on the e!ect of price uncertainty in making water/energy use
decisions, this experiment advances understanding of the role of uncertainty stemming from
consumers having imperfect information about the quantity they are consuming.
Households make many water and energy consumption decisions throughout a billing
period. The quantity is uncertain for at least three reasons: 1) most households lack the
means to track use throughout the billing period, 2) water and energy are inputs to various
household activities where the exact relationship is di"cult to know (e.g., how many gallons
of water does it take to keep a lawn green), and 3) quantity information and price signals
are intermittent, unclear and confusing. Bills are di"cult to understand, typically delivered
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only once a month, and water and energy are priced in obscure units like cubic feet and
kWh. Over the course of a billing period, consumers face what I define as two separate types
of quantity uncertainty: ‘backward uncertainty’, since it is di"cult or inconvenient to know
total consumption up to any given point in the period, and ‘forward uncertainty’, because
the household is unlikely to know how much they will consume throughout the remainder
of the period.16 17 This paper explores the e!ect of backward uncertainty on consumer
behavior.
What further complicates this decision-making environment is that households often face
non-linear pricing structures. Among U.S. energy and water utilities the most common non-
linear pricing structure is the increasing block rate (IBR) structure where the per unit price
increases by ‘blocks’ as total consumption increases. Typically the motivation of an IBR is to
provide a basic amount to everyone at an a!ordable price, encourage conservation/e"ciency,
and maintain stable and su"cient revenue for expensive capital infrastructure and mainte-
nance projects.18 When facing a non-linear rate structure, quantity uncertainty induces
marginal price uncertainty, as it is di"cult to know where consumption stands relative to
pricing thresholds.
16This paper is motivated by household water and energy use. However, the theory and the experiment
are context-free so the results can apply to more than water or energy use. The decision-making environment
presented here can apply to healthcare, cell phone use, credit cards, ‘smart’ parking meters and labor supply,
to name a few.
17These definitions are somewhat related to what some literature has termed ’rational ignorance’ or
’rational irrationality’ (Ameriks et al., 2004). See Nataraj and Hanemann (2011) for further background
on this issue. In Davis (2011): “Recent research has highlighted the many ways in which energy use is
particularly prone to what traditional economics would deem “irrational” behavior. Electricity and heat are
e!ectively invisible, their prices are delineated in abstract and unfamiliar units, and monthly billing ensures
a temporal distance between usage and payment”. Similarly, Jordan (1999) provides a good overview of
how water is di!erent from most goods, with emphasis on the how the billing system makes the ‘rational’
consumer assumptions unlikely to exist.
18This is still true for water utilities, though electricity utilities are increasingly turning to time-of-use
pricing, or criticial-peak pricing structures to address the unique load issues of energy demand and supply.
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Backward uncertainty can be reduced or eliminated by improving the timing of informa-
tion through more frequent feedback than typically occurs for household water and energy
use. The development in information technology known as advanced metering informa-
tion (AMI) systems is allowing greater access to and use of real-time information; these
systems create the potential for a two-way stream of communication between utilities and
customers.19 Utilities employ this technology to detect leaks, outages and ine"ciencies,
understand time-of-day consumption patterns, and improve demand forecasts, all of which
can lead to a better understanding of consumer behavior and responsiveness to policies. A
secondary use, which often lags these initial benefits of smart meters, is communication of
data back to households. Households can access real time, or near-real time, streams of
information on use, prices and total cost through an in-home display or a web portal. Cus-
tomers need to be provided with regular and coherent information in order to understand
the relationship between their actions, water/energy use and eventually their bill (List and
Price, 2013).20
As advanced metering technology is increasingly deployed, utilities hope that more fre-
quent information will encourage conservation and enhance e!ectiveness of existing demand-
side management (DSM) policies. However, evidence to date on their e!ectiveness has been
mixed. In this complicated environment, e!ective use of technology like smart meters will
require a better understanding of the following: 1) How removing backward uncertainty
through feedback a!ects total consumption and induces intra-period adjustments, 2) how
feedback a!ects price responsiveness, and 3) how the rate structure impacts the e!ect of
19See the 2009 survey: “Smart Metering for Utilities”, an Oracle White Paper for a thorough introduction
for the use of smart meters in utilities Oracle (2009).
20List and Price (2013) argue that salience (and norms) matter most in managing the key problems
utilities face. Making consumption and its cost salient via improved feedback and information results in
increased price sensitivity and e!ectiveness of pecuniary-based policies.
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feedback. Utility managers need to be aware of and consider the possible consequences when
designing interfaces and information.
In this chapter, I use the theoretical predictions developed in Chapter 2 in an expected
utility model of consumer behavior under quantity uncertainty. Like the theoretical model
presented in Chapter 2, the experimental setting is simplified to an individual making con-
sumption choices under input quantity uncertainty due to imperfect information. In the
computerized laboratory experiment, participants are incentivized to maximize profit: a se-
quence of decisions are made facing either complete uncertainty about input requirements or
only forward uncertainty if the individual receives feedback on her input use resulting from
previous decisions within the period. The feedback e!ect is tested under three rate structure
treatments: a constant marginal price structure and two versions of a two-tier increasing
block rate structure.
Results confirm that participants understood the experiment by responding to prices and
baseline incentives in a manner consistent with standard economic theory. Next, analysis
shows that more frequent feedback increased average consumption, increased variance in
weekly output levels and lowered price responsiveness – independent of rate structure. Re-
sults from the IBR sessions suggest that the e!ect of prices and the block boundary depend
on the distribution of user preferences relative to the block boundary. Participants with
preferences consistent with expected use below (above) boundary increased (decreased) use.
This result is consistent with the theory that researchers should observe ‘bunching’ at the
kink points (block boundaries) of a non-linear price schedule if individuals understand the
rate schedule and act rationally (Ito, 2014). This idea will be further discussed in reviewing
the related literature.
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There exists heterogeneity in the decision-making of participants, which can partially be
explained by di!erences in risk preferences and gender. Using estimates of risk preferences
elicited through a Holt and Laury (2002) lottery, I find that risk averse and risk neutral
participants are positively responsive to feedback and more price responsive than risk seeking
participants.21 I also find evidence of rate structure induced risk behavior in the IBR sessions
(i.e., risk neutral participants acting like they are risk averse due to the positive probability
of facing a higher marginal price). This behavior sometimes makes participants appear to
target the block boundary, however, the risk preferences explanation fits the data better.22
Finally, female participants are more responsive to feedback than their male counterparts,
a result which is interestingly independent of the other experiment treatments and risk
preferences.
This line of inquiry is important because utilities are faced with growing demand at a time
when supply expansion is increasingly costly, inconsistent and taxing on the environment.
“Concerns abound in the United States where a recent government survey suggests that at
least 36 states are anticipating some form of water shortage by 2013” (Ferraro and Price,
2013). In addition to anticipated gaps, current infrastructure is old and failing: “By the
year 2030, studies show the average water utility will have to spend 3.5 times more on pipe
replacement than it spends today” (Black and Veatch, 2013). Supply expansion is limited,
and to meet future needs, utilities need demand-side management (DSM) policies to result in
more reliable and consistent consumer responsiveness.23 The United States government sees
21The expected utility model developed in the conceptual framework section predicts much of the risk-
preference related behavior seen in the experiment.
22The notion of the boundary as a goal is actually in line with how IBRs are often designed. Utilities
price a quantity of ‘acceptable‘ use at the lowest block price, and use above that quantity is priced at a
higher marginal rate. Conservation is thus encouraged for activities above and beyond what is considered a
necessary amount of use. They are, in theory, designed with equity goals in mind.
23In addition to e"ciency goals, electricity DSM programs typically focuses on shifting demand from peak
to o!-peak hours of the day, whereas water programs aim to reduce peak summertime outdoor water use
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the smart grid as a means to modernize the U.S. electricity transmission and distribution
system, which involves the “integration of ’smart’ appliances and consumer devices” as well
as “provision to consumers of timely information and control options” (Congress, 2007).24
The Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 notes that “for the United States to
realize its full [energy] demand response potential, customers must have access to, and a
better understanding of, information about real-time or near-real-time prices” (Congress,
2007). Currently, most households do not have access to the level or type of information
needed to achieve these goals.
Despite this push, few utilities have yet to take advantage of the utility-to-household
smart meter communication opportunities and even where this data exists, program imple-
mentation often confounds clear analysis and privacy laws make it di"cult to study household
level data. Beyond these barriers to accessing ‘real world’ data, it is di"cult and costly to
apply di!erent treatments (like di!erent bill design, bill frequency or prices) to properly
randomized subsets of customers. The experiment presented here makes it possible to test
economic theories prior to incurring the risk and expense of a real-world application or field
test and does not disrupt real-world activities.25 I am not aware of any previous studies that
have considered the e!ect of resolving backward uncertainty in a controlled experimental
setting or the impact of information under alternative pricing schemes. This work comple-
ments a growing literature on price and quantity salience, as well as household water and
energy use.
24Though much of the attention is on smart grid development in the energy sector, there is growth on
the water side, too. See the summarizing article John (2012). Historically, water utilities tend to lag, but
eventually follow, the direction of electric utilities.
25See Mäki (2005), Samuelson (2005) and Smith (1989) for an examination of the relationship between
economic theory and experiments.
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The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.1 reviews the related
literature, Section 3.2 contains an overview of the experiment participants, experiment design
and the empirical model, and Section 3.4 discusses the results. Finally, Section 3.9 presents
some concluding thoughts.
3.1. Literature Review
3.1.1. Feedback and Information
There is evidence that households have limited information about their water and en-
ergy use. Jordan (2011) shows how, even with their water bill in front of them, it might
be di"cult for a household to identify how much water they have consumed. A study by
Attari et al. (2010) shows that the average individual underestimates household energy use
by a factor of 2.8 and is typically unaware of the most cost-e!ective ways to conserve en-
ergy (most choose reduced use over improving e"ciency). This reflects a lack of knowledge
surrounding water/energy use requirements of appliances. In a survey on energy feedback
preferences, Roberts et al. (2004) found that consumers “would, given the right feedback,
examine reasons for change in consumption and may be stimulated to take action”. Informa-
tive billing initiatives in Norway showed how customers appreciated improved accuracy and
extra information (historic and comparative feedback, a guide to which end-uses were the
highest consuming), began to read their bills more frequently and with more understanding,
and began to alter their behavior (Wilhite, 1997; Whilhite et al., 1999).26
Historically, frameworks like the information deficit model suggest that simply giving
people more information will improve knowledge and influence behavior, but a wealth of
26Karlan et al. (2010) find that reminders increased savings and that reminders will be more e!ective when
they increase the salience of a specific expenditure. Chetty et al. (2009) show using sales tax on groceries
that tax salience influences behavior: the more salient the tax, the lower the resulting consumption level.
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research shows that this is not always the case (Miller, 2001). From the field of psychology,
Lam et al. (2011) provide a review of the e!ect of feedback and show in their own experiment
that “frequent feedback can overwhelm an individual’s cognitive resource capacity, thus
reducing task e!ort and producing an inverted-U relationship with learning and performance
over time”. Lurie and Swaminathan (2009) find in an inventory management game that
more frequent feedback in a ‘noisy’ decision-making environment leads to “excessive focus
on and more systematic processing of more recent data as well as a failure to adequately
compare information across multiple time periods.” This literature suggests, in complicated
decision-making environments, feedback itself may not induce e!ective, e"cient or beneficial
adjustments to decisions.
Experiments in the psychology literature focuses on the e!ect of feedback or information
on performance, finding that despite the tendency to think that more information is always
better, there is actually a limit to an individual’s ability to e!ectively use the additional
feedback to better their decision-making. Diehl and Sterman (1995) find that subjects’
performance did improve somewhat as the time delay between action and result shortened,
but in a complex environment, subjects’ performance worsened with increased feedback
indicating that individuals have a di"cult time navigating complex settings. Kluger and
DeNisi (1998) perform a meta-analysis of the literature on feedback interventions (FI) to
date and find that FIs reduce performance in more than one-third of the cases. Atkins et al.
(2002) also find that subjects performed poorly in complex dynamic decision-making tasks.
In reviewing subject comments on decision rationales they find that “participants were aware
of complexity factors but were unable to cope with them e!ectively”. Other study results
that investigate the e!ect of feedback on use decisions are mixed: two separate investment
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experiments found that if participants expect to receive more frequent feedback or updated
information it lead to more conservative investment choices and lower investment quantities
overall to preserve flexibility (Gneezy and Potters, 1997; Bellemare et al., 2005) 27
Studies using energy and water field observations also yield mixed results on the impacts
of additional information both on the ability of consumers to improve decision-making and
on overall consumption. The first thrust of interest dates to the late 70’s and early 80’s where
a series of studies found that some information programs reduced electricity consumption,
while others found it increased consumption.28 These studies do generally agree that feedback
is more e!ective (either in reducing overall use or shifting to o!-peak periods) the more
frequently it is provided to the households (Fischer, 2008), though there are some studies
which show no change in behavior or even an increase in electricity use (Bittle et al., 1979).
Problems with the early studies include small sample size and failure to follow up on long-
term impacts.
The more recent swath of studies yield varied results, too. In the energy use studies,
some find solid evidence of conservation while others find no significant changes or even in-
creases in use. In a meta-analysis of studies focused on interventions in household energy use,
27These observations are not limited to the psychology literature, the rational inattention (which models
attention as a scarce resource) and bounded rationality literatures in the field of economics is growing and
often cited in research on household water and energy use. See Wiederholt (2010) for an introduction to
rational inattention and Kahneman (2003) for a resource on bounded rationality.
28For more specific examples of relevant research: Seligman and Darley (1977) found that immediate
feedback resulted in reduced energy use, though the study only used 29 homes. Another early electricity
study found that only monetary rebates reduced use, and feedback and information actually increased use
(Winett et al., 1978). Battalio et al. (1979) and Sexton and Sexton (1987) both found that households
enrolled in information or self-monitoring electricity programs, they revised their estimated costs downward
and increased consumption. Gaskell and Pike (1983) conducted a study asking householders to read their
meters daily. They also provided information on energy use to a subset of the study sample. Those who were
not provided with the information, and only checked their meters, actually increased consumption of natural
gas and electricity. Sexton et al. (1989) finds that an in-home display, which communicated time-of-day
pricing, mostly shifted energy use to o!-peak times and did not reduce consumption overall. Matsukawa
(2004) considers the role of an electricity monitoring device in the presence of a constant price structure on
electricity consumption and finds that, in general, households conserve in the presence of better information.
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Abrahamse et al. (2005) find that information/feedback increases knowledge but may not
induce any changes. The authors suggest that feedback combined with goal-setting or other
information programs are more e!ective than these programs alone (Abrahamse et al., 2005).
A report by Darby (2006) reviews 38 studies on feedback interventions finding that not all
resulted in energy savings, but those that did averaged between 5-15%. She warns that it
is important to recognize that “feedback is a necessary but not always a su"cient condition
for savings and awareness [amongst consumers]” (Darby, 2006). A survey of in-home dis-
play pilot programs across twelve U.S. energy utilities finds that feedback improved energy
e"ciency and reduced consumption by 7% on average (Faruqui et al., 2010).29 However,
Allcott and Rogers (2012) shows that responsiveness to personalized energy-use feedback
reports diminishes in between delivery of reports, a trend called “backsliding.”
Fewer studies have been conducted on water use. Two residential studies show that
better information/knowledge or frequent feedback actually increases water use: Carter and
Milon (2005) find that households who are ‘informed’ - have knowledge about marginal and
average price - consume relatively more water than those households who are less informed.
Strong and Goemans (forthcoming) find that households who had more frequent consumption
feedback through in-home display water smart meters consumed more than households who
only received information through a monthly bill.
There is one notable study that links the lab and the ‘real’ world: Chermak et al.
(2013), compare actual water use through historical billing with laboratory behavior and
find no di!erence in price elasticties between the ‘real’ behavior and the lab behavior for the
majority of the participants. This research suggests that experimental procedures, like the
29Even the currently hot research on social nudges and conservation behavior also note the importance of
frequency for information programs to be e!ective (?Allcott and Mullainathan, 2010). Much of the current
economic literature corroborates the findings in the field of psychology described earlier.
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one presented here, may be used to generate reliable, realistic data that is comparable to
‘real-world’ data and can “provide valuable insight looking forward – to consumer response
to price, situations or policies that do not exist yet” (Chermak et al., 2013).
3.1.2. Price Responsiveness and Rate Structure
Some studies focus on price knowledge and price responsiveness with the idea that more
e!ective and more frequent feedback to consumers could improve price responsiveness, which
would make DSM pricing policies more e!ective and possibly require less severe price in-
creases to meet desired reductions. For example, some studies have found that feedback
improves e!ectiveness of dynamic pricing policies like critical-peak pricing or time-of-use
pricing (Faruqui et al., 2010; Darby, 2006; Jessoe and Rapson, 2014). However, in addition
to evidence of households not knowing how much water or energy they consume, it is well
documented that consumers often lack knowledge of the rate structure they face and the
marginal price they face within a billing period because it is di"cult and costly to track use
or understand complicated rate structures (Foster and Beattie, 1981; Gaudin, 2006).30 Note
that this is di!erent from the marginal price uncertainty I focus on; these studies focus on
information improving knowledge of rate structures and prices whereas I assume households
know the rate structure and prices. In field studies of non-linear pricing, it is di"cult to
separate the e!ect of learning about consumption from the e!ect of learning about prices
and cost.
30Other surveys asking about price knowledge find that a small amount of people have any awareness
of prices. Of their respective study sample populations, Carter and Milon (2005) found 6%, Brown et al.
(1975) found 4.4%, and Stratus Consulting (1999) found 7% were aware of the correct prices. In a survey
of information presented on monthly electricity bills, Gaudin (2006) shows that price elasticity increased
by 30% or more when price information is given on the bill. Jessoe et al. (2013) show that factors other
than current prices influence electricity consumption choices, and better understanding of consumer behavior
might allow real-time feedback to enhance pricing policies.
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This issue of what price knowledge consumers have has led to the question of finding
out which price signal consumers do respond to, if any. In theory, when a population of
consumers face an IBR structure, the non-linear nature leads to disproportionately more
demand curves intersecting with the kink points (block boundaries), which is called ‘bunch-
ing.’ However, if consumers either do not fully know or understand their rate structure or
consumption patterns, then we would not expect to observe this pattern in real-world data
(Ito, 2014).31 Kahn and Wolak (2013) find that providing education and information about
an IBR structure leads consumers to respond to marginal prices, which results in an increase
in bunching.32 Strong and Goemans (forthcoming) also find that when households have an
in-home display, more households water use is closer to block boundaries. When partici-
pants have more frequent feedback (do not face backward uncertainty), I too find evidence
of increased bunching around the block boundary in the IBR sessions of my experiment.
Field data typically consists of consumers simultaneously facing the same price schedule,
so there are few studies on behavior under di!erent rate structures. Cavanagh et al. (2002)
and Olmstead et al. (2007) show that households are more responsive to water prices under
an IBR than a constant per-unit price and suggest that perhaps an IBR makes prices more
salient to consumers. However, a recent pilot program in the Commonwealth Edison ser-
vice area in Chicago does not find significant di!erences in consumption between flat rate
schedules and a variety of non-linear and dynamic rate structures (Wakefield et al., 2011).
31The focus on bunching stems from studies on behavior under non-linear tax structures, like federal
income taxes (de Bartolome, 1995; Saez, 2010; Chetty et al., 2010; Liebman and Zeckhauser, 2004). These
studies also relate to research finding that consumers responding more to average price than marginal price
(Shin, 1985; Ito, 2014)
32Kahn and Wolak (2013) show that teaching consumers to read their bill and understand the non-linear
price structure results in improved responsiveness to marginal prices rather than average prices. Those
customers who learn they face a marginal price lower than their average price increase consumption, while
those who learn that they instead face a marginal price higher than their average price decrease consumption.
See Kahn and Wolak (2013) for a concise description of what is required for an IBR to be e!ective.
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3.2. Experiment Overview
The central experiment, which mirrors the theoretical model in Chapter 2, is designed to
capture the household water/energy-use decision-making environment. Participants are in-
centivized to be profit-maximizing producers of a generic output, which require an uncertain,
randomly chosen amount of inputs ranging from one to five, each equally probable. The un-
certain input requirements were randomly drawn prior to the experiment, rather than being
generated during the experiment. A participant never knows the series of input require-
ments beforehand, and the series is held constant across all sessions for more straightforward
analysis.
Over the course of a session, a participant makes an output decision for each of four
‘weeks’ in each of twelve ‘months’ (forty-eight total choices). The participant knows his/her
individual marginal revenue schedule and the input price structure, both of which remain
constant for the entire session. The price parameters of the input price structure are also
known but change across months. Table 3.1 outlines how parameters change during a session.
An output decision is made without knowledge of that week’s input requirement condition
and therefore without complete knowledge of the marginal cost of producing an additional
output.
Each participant is randomly assigned to be either a “Low” or “High” value producer, which
was dictated by the marginal revenue (MR) schedule assignment: Marginal RevenueLow =
19 " 2Q, Marginal RevenueHigh = 29 " 2Q. These marginal revenue schedules were de-
signed to investigate how low and high value users may respond to feedback in general, but
especially in block rate structure treatments. These two groups of people can be thought to
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mimic low vs. high-income households, or households with indoor water use only vs. house-
holds with outdoor water use. The specific MR schedules are designed so that high value
producers would be expected to noticeably produce more output and therefore demand more
input units. Furthermore, under an increasing block rate structure, the high value producer
would on average, be expected to have an input demand in the higher-priced block, whereas
a low value producer’s input demand is expected to fall in block one.33,34
As shown in Table 3.1, in some months a participant only received monthly summaries of
their choices, including total revenue, total input use and cost, and profit. In these months
the participants are making decisions under complete uncertainty. In the other months,
participants not only saw the monthly summaries, but also received weekly updates after
they made a week’s output choice and the input condition was realized; this information
contained the previous week’s input requirement and input use, as well as the cumulative
input use to date. In these months, participants are making choices without backward
uncertainty. In all sessions, the participants were exposed to each feedback treatment (six
months of each treatment). All participants saw a feedback screen in between weekly output
choices, but in the months without the feedback treatment, some of the information was
33In the IBR82 session, low-value producer input demand is always expected to be below the block
boundary and high-value producer input demand is always expected to be above the block boundary. However
in the IBR41 sessions, while all high-value producer input demand is always expected to be above the block
boundary, there are some months where low-value producer input demand will also be expected to be greater
than the block boundary.
34Not only does the theoretical model require consideration of di!erent preferences, the literature also
suggests heterogeneity in responsiveness across preference: (Reiss and White, 2005) found considerable
heterogeneity in households’ price and income elasticities. A 2005 report, the Impact Evaluation of the
California Statewide Pricing Pilot, also found heterogeneity in price responsiveness of electricity use: high
energy-using households are more responsive to prices than low energy-using homes Associates (2005). The
di!erent producer preference types can be thought of as one that reflects a high willingness to pay, which
could indicate higher incomes or greater demand for non-essential uses of energy/water.
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not available. This is done to control for the participants seeing di!erent ‘amounts’ of
information.
Table 3.1. Experiment Timeline
Timing of Prices and Feedback
Month Price Level Session A Session B
1 Low Weekly Feedback
2 Low Weekly Feedback
3 High Weekly Feedback
4 High Weekly Feedback
5 Medium Weekly Feedback
6 Medium Weekly Feedback
7 Low Weekly Feedback
8 Low Weekly Feedback
9 High Weekly Feedback
10 High Weekly Feedback
11 Medium Weekly Feedback
12 Medium Weekly Feedback
Three di!erent versions of the experiment were conducted, testing two types of rate
structures: a constant marginal price, and two variations of a two-tier increasing block rate
structure. The first IBR’s block boundary is at 82 input units, while the other IBR’s block
boundary is at 41 input units. For each of these rate structures there was an ‘A’ and a
‘B’ session. Across A and B, the only di!erence is the ordering of the feedback treatment;
see Table 3.1. With this design, behavior is observed both with and without feedback,
facing identical parameters. In each rate structure, participants faced three price levels
across the twelves months. Table 3.2 outlines each of these levels across each rate structure.
Prices will be discussed in terms of levels throughout the remainder of the paper. Note the
di!erence between the CMP and IBR price definitions, as later I will discuss how the e!ect
of feedback varies by price level and rate structure, but it will not always be an apples-to-
apples comparison. For example, when comparing responsiveness to feedback in high-priced
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months, in the CMP sessions this will mean the participant faced $4 per input, while the
IBR session participants faced $2 per input up to the block boundary and $5 per input for
all inputs used beyond the block boundary.
Table 3.2. Definition of Price Levels (in lab dollars/input)
Rate Structure Constant Marginal Price (CMP) Increasing Block Rate (IBR)*
Prices Block 1 Block 2
Low Level $2 $2 $3
Medium Level $3 $2 $4
High Level $4 $2 $5
*Two IBR structures are tested: one with a block one boundary at 41 inputs, and
one with a block boundary at 82 inputs. A CMP rate structure can be alternatively
considered an increasing block rate structure with a boundary at zero.
There are five stages in a session procedure: (1) instructions, practice problems, and
clarifying questions, (2) the central experiment, (3) a Holt-Laury lottery experiment to elicit
risk preferences,35 (4) a series of survey questions, and (5) payment to the participants.36
3.2.1. Experiment Participants
Participants were recruited in undergraduate economics courses at Colorado State Uni-
versity. In total, 119 students participated across six sessions.37 Payment was based on
performance in the main experiment and results of the Holt-Laury lottery. The experiment
is conducted in terms of “lab dollars,” which are converted to real U.S. dollars using separate
35The lottery was conducted as follows: After the participants completed the lottery experiment, only
one of their 10 choices determined their additional earnings. We determined payo! by randomly selecting a
number between 1 and 10, which determined which set of lotteries (containing an A lottery and a B lottery)
were the “real” lotteries. Then a randomly selected number between 1 and 100 determined the outcome of
these lotteries. Then the participant’s earnings were increased by the payout amount, depending on which
of the lottery options they had selected.
36The experiment was developed and executed using zTree (Zurich Toolbox for Readymade Economic
Experiments), a user-friendly software program for experimental economics (Fischbacher, 2007).
37Several months after these initial six sessions, two more sessions were conducted using 21 local Water
and Electric Utility employees. Both an A and B session of the IBR82 version were conducted. Much to
the Utility practioners’ surprise, no di!erence was found between the student participants and the Utility
practitioners’ decision-making.
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conversion rates for high and low value producers to account for inherent di!erence in po-
tential earnings depending on this random value assignment: for high-value producers: 150
lab dollars= 1US dollar; 50 lab dollars= 1US dollar for low-value producers. An experiment
session lasted between 90 and 120 minutes with an average payout of $28.20.38
3.3. Data and Randomization
In setting up an experiment, a critical goal is to randomize the treatment assignments.
Treatment assignment should be independent of the impact of the treatment on the outcomes,
i.e., we assume conditional independence and no presence of selection bias or omitted variable
bias.39 The two main treatment variations are the weekly feedback assignment and the
rate structure assignment. All participants received weekly feedback in half of the months
and only the monthly feedback in the other half, so there is no need to worry about the
randomization of the feedback treatment. The rate structure treatment assignment depended
on which day the participants registered for the experiment. We conducted two sessions of
the CMP structure, and four of the IBR structure (two with block boundary=82; two with
block boundary=41). There are no statistically significant di!erences in average participant
characteristics across sessions or rate structures. The producer type (High or Low) was
assigned to the laboratory computers on an alternating basis; so the assignment of these
38Experiment payouts have been subject to criticism in experiments: It has been found to be better to
have payout be a function of performance in the game instead of a flat pay out (Croson, 2005). As such, all
decisions made in the main experiments and the lottery are made to be potentially payo! relevant in order
to ensure incentive compatibility. Payment for the main experiment portion is based upon the participant’s
cumulative earnings across all twelve months, and payment for the lottery is described above. Croson (2005)
also argues that the payout needs to be comparable with the opportunity cost of the participant’s time. The
average payout of $28.20 across all sessions is quite reasonable for undergraduate students.
39Participation in one group or another should not a!ect the distribution of potential outcomes, after
controlling for the variation in outcomes induced by di!erences in participant characteristics. By randomizing
across treatment groups, the di!erence in the average outcomes for the treated and the non-treated groups
is the average treatment e!ect. This is easily controlled for in a laboratory experiment but is more di"cult
with field experiments where participants likely self-select into the di!erent treatment groups, e.g. opting
in to a utility pilot program. Also, we do not need instrumental variables or other econometric means to
handle endogeneity because we can assume the treatment variable to exogenous.
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preferences depended on where the participant sat down, which is highly unlikely to be
correlated with their decision-making characteristics. They could have just as easily sat at
the computer next to theirs and had the other producer preferences.
Table 3.3 provides brief information on variables used throughout the results section.
Table 3.3. Description of Variables
Variable Type Description Variation
Month Input Continuous Total inputs used in the month Individual & Month
Month Output Continuous Total output produced in the month Individual & Month
Feedback Dummy =1 if a month with weekly input feed-
back
Individual & Month
Producer Type Dummy =1 if a high-value producer Individual
Low Price Level Dummy =1 if a month with the low price level Month
Med Price Level Dummy =1 if a month with the medium price
level
Month
High Price Level Dummy =1 if a month with the high price level Month
CMP Dummy =1 if CMP rate structure Session
IBR82 Dummy =1 if IBR structure with threshold at
82 inputs
Session
IBR41 Dummy =1 if IBR structure with threshold at
41 inputs
Session




The results section is organized as follows: (1) an analysis of the internal validity of the
experiment, (2) the e!ect of feedback on monthly totals, and weekly decisions, (3) the e!ect
of feedback on price responsiveness, (4) the e!ect of the rate structure, and (5) discussion of
behavior and heterogeneity.
3.4.1. Internal Validity: Did the participants understand the Experiment?
The participants responded to fundamental incentives as standard economic theory pre-
dicts. Figure 3.1a illustrates that participants assigned high-value preferences produced
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more output each month than the participants assigned with low-value preferences. The
producer output di!erence was greatest during the constant marginal price sessions, with
high-value producers producing an average of about 45% more output each month, though
the expected utility model predictions suggest that high-value participants should produce
about twice as much as low-value participants in CMP sessions. The increasing block rate
structures induced smaller di!erences across producers: 36% and 27% for the IBR82 and
IBR41 sessions, respectively. Figure 3.1a also shows that participants responded to higher
prices by producing less output. Finally, Figure 3.1b shows that participants responded to
rate structures as expected: On average, output was largest during the IBR82 sessions, and
smallest during the CMP sessions. These results are due to the way price levels are set, as
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(b) Monthly Input and Output levels by Rate
Structure
Figure 3.1. Internal Validity
3.4.2. Feedback Effect
Most of the following results are presented in terms of e!ects on input demand. While
individuals make choices about output, the overall goal of this study is to evaluate the impact
on input demand. A water utility, for example, is interested in and can more readily observe
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how water use changes rather than what the household does to change their water use. The
analysis will focus on output when investigating how participants adjusted behavior from
week to week.
3.4.2.1. Month Level. To isolate the e!ect of feedback on input use, I estimate the fol-
lowing random e!ects model where wjm denotes total monthly input demand for participant
j in month m. This will be the baseline model of analysis. Other portions of the results
will deviate from this model by splitting the sample, including interaction terms and, in the
week-to-week analysis, changing the dependent variable.
wjm = "i + #1Feedbackjm + #2MedPricem + #3HighPricem + #4IBR82j + #5IBR41j
+#6ProducerTypej + #7AvgRequm + uj + $jm
(8)
Table 3.4 contains the regression results from the model in Equation 8. Participants
repsond to prices as expected: input demand decreases as input price increases. Feedback,
on average, increases average input use by 2.92 (which is approximately 1 more output per
month). Participants’ average input demand is the largest under IBR82 and lowest under
the CMP rate structure. High-value producers used about 22 more inputs per month than
low-value producers, on average.40 These results are consistent with standard economic
theory.
40While in some scenarios and in some studies cited in the introduction information has been shown to
reduce consumption, these findings are not at odds with those found here. The e!ect of information depends
partially upon the content of the information. For example, in the caloric intake study, consumers were
underestimating their consumption and therefore the feedback was negative and they reduced consump-
tion (Bollinger et al., 2011), though in another study on calories postings, Loewenstein (2011) found that
consumers increased caloric intake with improved information on caloric content.
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Medium Price Level -6.289***
(1.404)













Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, *** denotes
p-values of 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 respectively.
Low Price Level and CMP are the categories left out of
the price and rate structure dummy variable structures,
respectively.
3.4.3. Weekly Decisions
Analyzing week-to-week output choices rather than input demand will illustrate how
the participants adjusted their output choice behavior for each of the feedback treatments.
Feedback reduces uncertainty and provides additional information. Participants are therefore
expected to be more likely to adjust weekly output choices when they have access to this
information.
To illustrate, I first compute the standard deviation from the average weekly output
level for each participant in each month and compare the distribution of all participants by
feedback treatment. Figure 3.2 illustrates this, showing that the standard deviation from the
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mean weekly output level increases with feedback, i.e., the distribution shifts to the right.
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Figure 3.2. Distribution across All Sessions
Output choices in weeks without feedback are more correlated than the weekly output
choices in months with the weekly feedback. With complete uncertainty, participants are
only expected to make decisions based on their preference assignment, prices and expecta-
tions about the input requirement. High-value producers’ output choices are slightly more
correlated across weeks than the output choices of low-value producers, regardless of feedback
treatment. Output choices in the CMP sessions are more correlated across weeks than in
the IBR sessions. For the complete set of correlation coe"cients, see Table A.2 in Appendix
A.2.
The theoretical framework suggest that the e!ect of feedback is conditional on the actual
information provided. The feedback e!ect is augmented by two pieces of information, (1)
the previous week’s input requirement condition relative to the average input requirement,
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and (2) the updated input use total. For example, if the feedback received after week 1
revealed that input requirement conditions were higher than expected, the individual may
reduce their output choice in week 2. But, if the feedback revealed a lower-than-expected
input requirement then the individual may instead increase her output choice in week 2.
I segment the analysis into two sections, CMP observations and IBR observations, since
theory predicts that the e!ect of feedback is influenced by the presence of a non-linear rate
structure.
For each week, I run the following random e!ects model shown in Equation 9 where xjs
denotes the output choice for participant j in week s. Even though the subscript s is used
all independent variables actually vary at the individual or month level, with the exception
of the Feedback interaction term. For CMP session participants, the updated input use
total information should have less of an impact on decisions than in the IBR sessions since
there are no pricing thresholds, and as such, we do not include this interaction term in the
regression.41 It was included on the weekly feedback screens in CMP sessions to avoid any
bias in participants seeing di!erent amounts of information across rate structure treatments.




+#4MedPrices + #5HighPrices + #6ProducerType+ $js
(9)
41Including the feedback interaction term with the updated input total results in insignificant coe"cients
for all feedback terms. This result isn’t surprising because while the overall e!ect of feedback at the month
level is significant, breaking it down by weekly output breaks down the e!ect into smaller and less signifi-
cant e!ects. This is not the case for IBR sessions because the updated input total reduces marginal price
uncertainty.
64
Table 3.5 presents the results, which suggest that feedback increases average weekly
output levels, significantly in weeks 2 and 4, and the input requirement appears to not
significantly influence weekly output choices.42
Table 3.5. E!ect of Feedback on Weekly Output Choices: CMP sessions only
Dependent Var: x1 x2 x3 x4
Feedback 0.184 0.378** -0.169 0.442**
(0.198) (0.198) (0.199) (0.212)
Feedback'[rs!1 " r̄] — -0.015 0.133 0.036
(0.116) (0.103) (0.123)
Standard errors are in parentheses. Results are from the random
e!ects model (equation 9) which also controls for producer value
type and price level.
*, **, *** denotes p-values of 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 respectively.
In the IBR sessions, the updated input use total information is expected to a!ect weekly
output choices since it allows participants to learn where input use is relative to the block
boundary and marginal price threshold. Furthermore, this part of the feedback e!ect is likely
to be di!erent for individuals learning input use is above or below the pricing threshold. As
such, for IBR sessions, the weekly output regression model in Equation 9 is split by updated
input total (above or below block boundary). Table 3.6 presents these results.43
One issue in estimation of the e!ect of feedback, conditional on these pieces of informa-
tion, is the fact that the updated input use total is a function of previous output decisions
within the week. As noted earlier, week-to-week output decisions are correlated, making the
updated input use total likely to be correlated with the error term. I use an instrumental
42For week 1, we can only test for the di!erence in expecting to have weekly feedback throughout the
month.
43Again, for week 1, we can only test for the di!erence in expecting to have weekly feedback throughout
the month. The participants know that they will be receiving weekly feedback throughout the coming
‘month.’ This knowledge appears to results in increased production in week 1, which is consistent with the
precautionary savings literature. For week 2 estimation, a collinearity issue arises if both Feedback*r1 " r̄
and Feedback*w1 are included as independent variables. As a result, only Feedback*r1 " r̄ is kept in the
week 2 output regression.
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variables estimation approach to address this issue. While input use totals are not ran-
dom across weeks, the input requirement and whether or not the individual received weekly
feedback are both random and not correlated with the error term.
Table 3.6. E!ect of Feedback on Weekly Output Choices: IBR sessions only
Learn:
!s!1
1 (ws) $ B
Dependent Var: x1 x2 x3 x4
Feedback 0.313** 0.222* 1.826*** 4.134***
(0.139) (0.135) (0.673) (0.0138)








1 (ws) > B
Dependent Var: x1 x#2 x3 x4
Feedback — -2.420** -0.295 -1.599
(0.949) (0.461) (2.984)




1 (ws) — — 0.008 0.0213
(0.030) (0.035)
# Note that for the IBR82 sessions, no participants’ input use total
exceeds the block boundary until week 3. There are only 21 observations
across the months in IBR41 sessions where a participant learns that
input use is already over 41 after week 2.
Standard errors are in parentheses. Results are from the random e!ects
model (equation 9) which also controls for producer value type and price
levels. Sample is split by input total above or below block boundary.
*, **, *** denotes p-values of 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 respectively.
If the individual learns that total input use is below the block boundary, feedback in-
creases weekly output levels. This e!ect increases in magnitude across weeks. However, when
the participant learns that their updated input total is above the block boundary, feedback
decreases output production. The value of the previous week’s input requirement relative
to the average is generally negative, as expected, but typically not statistically significant.
These results corroborate the bunching and risk preference results discussed in Section ??.
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3.5. Effect of Feedback on Price Responsiveness
Since feedback provides additional information to respond to, feedback will likely a!ect
price responsiveness. To test this, I estimate Equation 8, but adjust the model to additionally
include feeback-price level interaction terms. Table 3.7 shows the relative strengths of the
e!ects of price and feedback on monthly input demand. The baseline average monthly
input demand (28.35 units) is for low price level months without feedback. When facing the
lowest price level, feedback has no significant e!ect on input demand. The overall e!ect of
increasing the price above the low level is negative, i.e., input demand decreases. However,
for both medium and high price levels, price responsiveness is muted for participants making
decisions in months with weekly feedback. Prices drive input demand down, but feedback
reduces uncertainty and drives input demand up.
Table 3.7. Relative Strength of Feedback and Price E!ects












*, **, *** denotes p-values of 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01
respectively.
Estimates from a version of the random e!ects
model 8 as seen in Table 3.4, but with price-
feedback interaction terms.
† Relative to lowest price level months without
feedback.
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As outlined in the literature review, there are a number of studies that have found that
feedback increases price responsiveness. I do not believe that those results are necessarily
at odds with my findings. In this study, the e!ect of reducing quantity uncertainty (e!ect
of feedback) is isolated as much as possible from the e!ect of removing price uncertainty.
Given that most households do not know or understand the rate structure they face (Carter
and Milon, 2005), it is likely that the field studies are capturing the co-mingled e!ect of a
household learning about quantity and prices at the same time. In some cases, feedback has
been provided in the midst of implementing a conservation pricing structure and/or other
conservation messaging (e.g., drought conditions) concurrently. In this study, feedback is
identified to have a positive e!ect on consumption for most participants. In other studies,
this may still be the case but other incentives may be stronger and result in a net reduction
in consumption.
3.6. Rate Structure Effects
The e!ect of feedback and price responsiveness varies by rate structure. To show this, I
run the model in Equation 8 with the sample split by rate structure. The results presented
in Table 3.8 show that e!ect of feedback is strongest under the constant marginal price rate
structure, and the least impactful under the IBR with the largest first block width (82).
Weekly feedback increases average input demand by approximately 4.4, 3.2 and 1.4 units
for CMP, IBR41 and IBR82 sessions, respectively. Participants facing the IBR with block
boundary of 41 input units are more responsive to feedback than those facing the IBR82
structure partially because there are fewer ‘cheap’ input units available to use before facing
the higher marginal price, and therefore updated information on input use-to-date is more
important. Reponsivesness to feedback may be strongest in the CMP sessions because, with
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the exception of the low price level months, participants do not have access to ‘cheap’ input
units ($2/input). The CMP session participants may therefore ‘value’ the weekly feedback
more than those in IBR sessions who, regardless of price level, will always be able to use
some inputs at the lowest possible marginal price.
Table 3.8. Feedback and Price E!ects across Rate Structures
Partial E!ects on Monthly Input Demand
CMP IBR41 IBR82
Feedback E!ect 4.412** 3.181** 1.375*
(1.952) (1.542) (1.641)
E!ect of Medium Price Level† -6.422** -10.245*** -2.187
(1.952) (2.180) (-0.940)
E!ect of High Price Level† -14.236*** -14.620*** -7.822***
(2.574) (2.033) (2.164)
*, **, *** denotes p-values of 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 respectively.
Estimates from a version of the random e!ects model 8 as seen in
Table 3.4, but with the sample split by rate structure.
† Relative to lowest price level.
This is corroborated by the fact that particpants are also less responsive to prices the
further away the block boundary is, i.e., particpants in CMP and IBR41 sessions decrease
input demand more in response to price change than those in the IBR82 sessions.44 This
result also makes sense because as the width of the first block decreases, more participants are
impacted by the price change. Approximately 88% of observed monthly input demand totals
are above the block boundary in the IBR41 sessions, whereas only 43% of observations are
above the block boundary in the IBR82 sessions.45 Most participants in the IBR41 sessions
44Recall that for CMP when the price changes, the price of all units change. For the IBR structures, only
the price of the second block of units changes. When comparing price responsiveness, the two IBR structures
can be directly compared for each price level. A CMP structure can be thought of as a IBR structure with
a block boundary at zero units. However, given the design of the prices the comparison from the CMP to
an IBR is less straightforward, as discussed in the experiment overview 3.2. For example, the medium price
level for CMP is $3/input, but the block rate structures are priced at $2/input for the first block of units
and $4/input for all units beyond the block boundary.
45The feedback e!ect appears small in the IBR82 sessions, but if we split the sample by input total above or
below the block boundary as was done in the week-to-week analysis, results show that those below the block
boundary respond positively to feedback and are less responsive to changes in block 2 prices. Participants
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may be treating their rate structure more like a CMP structure since they, on average, expect
to be in the second block and facing the higher marginal price.
3.7. Behavioral Considerations
As some of the literature suggests, individuals may be responding to the ‘wrong’ infor-
mation when provided with feedback in uncertain, complex decision-making environments
(Lurie and Swaminathan, 2009; Diehl and Sterman, 1995; Atkins et al., 2002). The fact that
participants are less price responsive when provided weekly feedback suggests that perhaps
they are more responsive to the information about input use instead. In the IBR sessions,
results of the week-by-week output analysis show that participants increase (decrease) input
use if they learn that their current input total is below (above) the block boundary. Further-
more, written comments provided by participants after the experiment suggest that some
focused excessively on the block boundary, and perceived the boundary as a ‘goal’ input
level. Recall that Abrahamse et al. (2005) suggests that feedback may be more e!ective
when paired with goal setting. In the absence of explicit goal setting, the participants may
be assuming the block boundary is the goal for input demand. One possible explanation
for this behavior is that participants in the IBR are ‘targeting’ the block boundary, and do
so more obviously when they have feedback which informs where input use is relative to
the boundary. To address this possibility, I generate a variable of input ‘distance’ to block




who are above the boundary in respond negatively to feedback and are significantly price responsive. As
such, the combined e!ect is smaller and overall positive. However, this is not a perfect apples-to-apples
comparison, since the e!ect of feedback is conditional on past behavior, which cannot be instrumented for
as was done in the week-to-week analysis.
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A value of zero would indicate that input demand for the month was equal to the block
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Figure 3.3. Monthly Input Demand“Distance” to Block Boundary
Figure 3.3 shows that with feedback a great percentage of observations occur closer to the
block boundary. With feedback, participants whose input use is below the block boundary
increase consumption toward the block boundary, while those in the second block decrease
consumption. This relative increase in observations around the block boundary is evidence
of increased bunching, as discussed in the literature review (Section 3.1.2). The literature
suggests that if a researcher observes a lack of bunching at a kink point, consumers may not
know or understand the non-linear price schedule they face. Here, I suggest that without
feedback there is less bunching because quantity is non-salient. Participants know the price
schedule, but without feedback they are uncertain of if (or when) input demand is in the
second block. With feedback, input quantity is more salient, distance to the second block
(and the higher marginal prices) is more salient, and thus results in greater bunching at
the kink points. However, for the IBR41 sessions, while some participants’ input demand
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decreases toward the block boundary, there are a number who are above the block boundary
and still increase input demand. If targeting were the correct explanation for behavior under
an IBR structure, we would not expect this pattern.
The alternative, and more accurate, explanation for behavior seen in the experiment is
risk preferences. As seen in the theoretical framework, the e!ect of feedback when facing
a linear price structure hinges on risk preferences, e.g., a risk averse (seeking) individual
is expected to increase (decrease) monthly output production and input use if provided
feedback that reduces uncertainty (these findings are summarized in Tables 2.1). Figure
3.4 illustrates the percent change in monthly input demand with feedback, as compared
to no weekly feedback, for CMP sessions. As predicted, risk seeking participants reduced
input demand and risk averse participants increased input demand when provided complete
weekly feedback. Risk neutral participants are predicted to have no di!erence in input
demand, however we see an increase on average.46
Risk-related predictions will be muted or enhanced by the presence of a non-linear rate
structure since, unlike the CMP structure, there is a positive probability of the consumer fac-
ing a higher marginal price. Furthermore, behavior induced by the non-linear rate structure
depends on whether the individual expects total input use to fall above or below the block
boundary. Figure 3.5 illustrates the e!ect of feedback conditional on risk class, with the IBR
sample split by those whose input demand falls below or above the block boundary.47
46The theoretical framework shows that the e!ect of feedback will be influenced by the content of the
feedback. On average the input requirements in the experiment are truly randomly drawn and therefore the
input requirements are on average equal to 3. As such, when discussing changes in average monthly input
demand there is no need to discuss input requirements specifically.
47Figure A.2, in the Appendix, instead splits the sample by producer-value type, which is a less precise
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Figure 3.5. E!ect of Feedback on Average Monthly Input Demand by Risk Class
As anticipated, risk neutral participants whose input demand is less than the block
boundary increase average input demand when provided feedback, appearing to act as if they
are risk averse. Risk averse participants below the block boundary increase average input
demand by even more than the risk neutral participants when provided weekly feedback.
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The risk seekers whose input demand falls below the block boundary slightly decrease input
demand, suggesting that true risk preferences are stronger than the influence of the rate
structure. The e!ect of feedback is also impacted by the rate structure for those whose input
demand is in block 2: true risk neutral participants appear to be risk seeking by reducing
monthly input demand when provided feedback, and true risk seekers reduce average monthly
input demand by even more than the risk neutral participants. The risk averse individual
still increases input demand when provided feedback, but by less than those below the block
boundary illustrating the muting e!ect of the rate-structure. This again suggests that the
influence of risk preferences are stronger than the influence of the rate structure.
The majority of participants are found to be risk averse or risk neutral in the Holt-Laury
lottery, which explains why participants below the block boundary increase use, appearing
to be ‘target’ the block boundary. For participants above the block boundary, feedback
results in an increased input demand for those who are risk averse and a decrease for risk
neutral and risk seeking individuals. As such, the predictions in the theoretical model match
behavior in the experiment and dispel the possibility that consumers facing an IBR structure
are targeting the block boundary.
3.8. Heterogeneity
3.8.1. Gender
Gender turns out to be a strong driver in di!erences across decision-making. To show
this I run model in Equation 8 with the sample split by gender; results are presented in
Table 3.9, the male participants were not systematically responsive to feedback as a group.
Female participants, however, were significantly and positively responsive to feedback in
terms of input demand. Table 3.9 is a condensed table; full regression results can be found
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in Table A.4 in the Appendix. Despite this result, female participants tend to earn less
in profits over the course of the experiment. This suggests one of two things: (a) that
females are more conservative in their production decisions to start with, so despite being
responsive to feedback, they will necessarily earn less profit, or (b) female participants are
ine!ectively responding to feedback and reducing their earnings as a result. The gap between
average earnings between months with and without weekly feedback, however, is larger for
males than for females. Males also typically earned less in months with weekly feedback,
suggesting that hypothesis (a) may be more accurate. We do find that even when controlling
for producer value assignment, female participants consistently produced less output and
used fewer inputs than their male counterparts.48
Table 3.9. Role of Gender
Male Female
Independent Variable Monthly Input Demand
Feedback 1.577 5.245***
(1.230) (1.504)
Medium Price Level -4.684*** -8.920***
(1.832) (2.126)
High Price Level -12.241*** -12.158***
(1.709) (1.983)
Standard errors are in parentheses.
*, **, *** denotes p-values of 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 respectively.
Estimates from a version of the random e!ects model in Equa-
tion 8, but with the sample split by gender. Only the coe"cients
on feedback and price level dummy variables are included in this
table.
Another possiblity for this di!erence stems from the evidence in the literature that fe-
males tend to be more risk averse and responsive than men. A meta-analysis of risk-taking
tendencies found that women are more risk averse than men, a gap that decreases with age
48The result of gender di!erences in average output production and input use is statistically significant
at the 1% level.
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(Byrnes et al., 1999). Croson and Gneezy (2009) survey economic experiments and also find
women to be more risk averse than men. However, gender is not strongly correlated with
our risk preference measure and, on average, male participants are slightly more risk averse
than the females. These facts do not support risk preferences as the reason for di!erences
by gender in decision-making. As such, gender and risk preferences can be two unique ways
of classifying consumers and explaining di!erences in decision-making.
3.9. Conclusion
This chapter explores the e!ect of quantity uncertainty on consumption and price re-
sponsiveness, in the presence of two common rate structures. The decision-making setting is
designed to mimic household water and energy use, though this restriction is not necessary
and the results can be applied to other similar decision-making settings. A theoretical frame-
work containing an expected utility model generates predictions that are tested using data
from a computerized laboratory experiment. The e!ect of removing backward uncertainty
is found to depend on the realization of the uncertainty quantity, the rate structure and risk
preferences.
While utility managers hope that providing households with more frequent feedback on
consumption will encourage conservation and enhance existing pricing policies, this is not
necessarily the case. Results suggest that more frequent feedback may induce individuals to
consume more, not less. Demand will likely be more variable, and depending on the rate
structure in place, individuals may be less responsive to prices, too. Participants become
more responsive to feedback and prices when they are or expect to be impacted by price
changes. These results leads to two considerations for rate structure design with the ability
to frequently communicate with consumers: a constant marginal price may be more e!ective
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for encouraging price responsiveness, and price responsiveness under an increasing block rate
greatly depends on the distribution of consumers.
Given that choices are made under some level of uncertainty, risk preferences play a key
role: risk averse and risk neutral participants are positively responsive to feedback, while
risk seeking participants tend to not respond to feedback but generally reduce consumption
when backward uncertainty is removed. There is also evidence of rate structure induced
risk preferences during the IBR sessions. Despite the common link between gender and risk
preferences documented in the literature, this study finds no correlation, but does find that
female participants clearly increase consumption in response to feedback and tend to make
more conservative consumption decisions. Male participants, as a group, are less responsive
to feedback. These results highlights the importance of understanding the consumer base
and responsiveness: for example, who in a household pays the utility bills and influences
water and energy consumption decisions?
This study contributes to the literature on decision-making under uncertainty and the
literature on water/energy demand. First, this study provides a theoretical framework for the
decision-making environment which incorporates two distinct types of quantity uncertainty
(forward and backward), multiple decisions within a billing period and explicitly accounts
for di!erent categories of risk preferences. Second, the theory and the experimental results
highlight important factors when considering rate structure and information design. Finally,
the study provides an experimental baseline to compare to existing and future field studies.
This paper contributes to a better understanding of consumer behavior under uncertainty,
and serves as a basis for many additional research areas including the e!ect of di!erent
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An Empirical Analysis on the effect of Combined
Energy and Water Utility Bills
4.1. Introduction
In the American West, water supplies are increasingly variable during a time when pop-
ulation – and urban water demand – is expected to continue growing rapidly. As such,
demand-side management (DSM) programs are becoming more important as utilities project
less reliable water supplies. Price elasticity and the factors that influence water demand are
of particular interest because price is increasingly used to reflect scarcity and encourage con-
servation (Faruqui et al., 2010). Furthermore, utilities are often constrained by zero-profit
mandates yet have considerably high fixed costs. This means that utilities using volumetric
pricing must be confident in the relationship between price and quantity demanded, since a
change in either will a!ect revenue, which has serious implications for utilities’ infrastruc-
ture projects and long-term planning (Olmstead et al., 2007). Water and energy utilities are
increasingly pricing their services according to complex non-linear rate structures known as
increasing block rate (IBR) structures.49 There is uncertainty as to what degree consumers
know about and understand these rate structures.
Household water/energy decision-making environments are significantly more compli-
cated than the typical consumption decision. Liebman and Zeckhauser (2004) identify con-
ditions that may prevent consumers from perfectly optimizing at the margin of household
water/energy use: (1) Complex, non-linear rate structures that are updated or altered often,
49This is true for water utilities, though electric utilities are switching to time-of-use rate structures that
better reflect the cost structure of electricity generation.
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(2) a gap in time between the benefit of consumption and realization of the cost (payment),
(3) combined or bundled goods/services, and (4) when the environment is not conducive
to learning. These conditions partly stem from the fact that energy and water are actually
inputs to other goods which makes it di"cult for a customer to derive the cost of activities
like air conditioning and clothes washing. Also, there are unclear and infrequent pricing sig-
nals and as a result, there is evidence that consumers may instead be responding to average
prices or total bills rather than marginal prices. “Assuming that customers are perfectly
informed and perfectly optimizing on the margin, is at odds with the way that nearly every-
one actually thinks about their residential water and electricity consumption” (Borenstein,
2009).
This study provides new evidence surrounding Condition (3), specifically the question of
how billing for multiple utility services through a combined bill influences price responsive-
ness to the price of water services. This analysis is made possible by a novel data set that
includes billing and consumption information for water, electricity and natural gas for a large
number of households across nearly ten years. A single utility provides all three services and
also bills for all three services through a single monthly bill. Even when the cost of a billing
period’s worth of consumption is realized, a given service’s price signal may be muddled
by the costs of the other services. Consumers may be responding to total cost or to prices
of other services. Even attentive customers might find the most e"cient or cost-e!ective
way to a!ect their cost by altering behavior unclear, and as such combined bills may ren-
der demand-management policies less e!ective. It may not be correct to model consumers
price responsiveness in terms of the marginal price as in traditional economic theory if there
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is potential that the consumer is unclear or unaware of the relationship between quantity
consumed and the marginal price.
In this study, I model the salience of the water price signal, given that water is billed
along with electricity and natural gas within a single bill. I allow the responsiveness of price
to vary by the weight of the water portion of the bill relative to the total utility bill. I find
that responsiveness to water prices increases as the proportion of the total bill attributable
to water services increases. Households pay more attention to water prices, when their water
use contributes to a greater portion of their total utility spending. I also provide evidence
that the number of services subscribed to, and therefore the number of price signals, also
influences consumption patterns and price responsiveness. This study provides additional
support of household water demand being generally inelastic, but not unresponsive, with
respect to water prices. Given this unique data set I am able to provide evidence of how
di!erent combinations of bills, and the varying proportion of a bill attributable to water,
a!ects water responsiveness.
This paper is organized as follows: First, I review the relevant literature. Next, I present
the empirical models followed by a description of the data. Finally, I discuss the results and
present some concluding remarks as well as some suggestions for future work in this area.
4.2. Literature Review
This study builds on work in the behavioral economics literature, including the bounded
rationality literature, as well as the work in the salience literature, which covers how the
availability and accessibility of information a!ects decision-making. I also discuss literature
related to the e!ect of combined bills or purchases within the salience context. Much of
the literature agrees that the typical household does not know the prices they face or how
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much they consume (Jordan, 2011; Carter and Milon, 2005). Households underestimate
their water use by a factor of 2, on average (Attari, 2014). Attari (2014) also finds that
most households perceive curtailing use as a more e!ective strategy to conserving water
than e"ciency improvements. This perception conflicts with expert recommendations on
the most e!ective ways to reduce use. Similar findings for energy use are detailed in an
earlier study Attari et al. (2010).
The bounded rationality literature explains that sometimes decision-makers use heuristics
to transform a complex decision into an easier one.50 This theory states that the use of
average price as an approximation of actual marginal price is rational if the cognitive cost
of responding to the marginal price is higher than the associated utility gain. Liebman and
Zeckhauser (2004) termed this smoothing of a tiered rate structure as ‘ironing’.51 Ironing
will occur “when there is a single payo! for all of the bundled choices within an accounting
period” (Liebman and Zeckhauser, 2004). Average price is easy to calclate from information
commonly provided on a utility bill.The gain from re-optimizing consumption with marginal
price is likely to be quite small if consumers have already optimized with respect to average
price since rate structures are complicated and most households do not have access to real
time information on use, information that would be necessary to know the marginal price
they face.52 The case studies in Liebman and Zeckhauser (2004) show that a consumer may
over-consume and be less price responsive under the conditions consistent with the complex
decision-making environment surrounding household water/energy use.
50See Kahneman (2003), DellaVigna (2009) for an introduction to the bounded rationality literature.
51In addition to a theoretical treatment, Liebman and Zeckhauser (2004) illustrate ironing using the 1998
introduction of the Child Tax Credit.
52The rational inattention literature is somewhat related. It models attention as a scare resource. Indi-
viduals must decide how to allocate their attention and, in the context of this study, a household will have
to choose what information surrounding their water and energy use to pay attention to and what to ignore.
See Wiederholt (2010) for an introduction to rational inattention; see Ameriks et al. (2004) for a discussion
of the ‘absent-minded’ consumer.
82
The salience literature focuses on how the accessibility and availability of information
a!ects decision-making. Gaudin (2006) highlights that in markets with ex post billing, like
municipal utilities, prices are less salient and “when prices are not transparent, elasticity es-
timates are potentially lower than their full information potential.” In her sample, including
price Information on utility bills increased price responsiveness by 30% (Gaudin, 2006), and
”when prices are not transparent, elasticity estimates are potentially lower than their full
information potential.” In a time-of-use pricing study, Jessoe et al. (2013) find that real-
time information increased responsiveness to temporary price increases by three standard
deviations.
Gilbert and Gra!-Zivin (forthcoming) identify two key reasons that utility prices are likely
not salient to consumers. First, rate structures are complicated and can confuse customers.
Second, consumption decisions are made in real-time whereas the cost is only “experienced”
monthly when the bill arrives. The infrequent access to quantity and price information
makes it nearly impossible to respond to marginal prices at the point of consumption. And
second, consumption decisions are spread out across appliances without price information for
individual uses. Even if the marginal price of a unit of electricity were known with certainty,
translating this price into the price of running the dishwasher or powering a flat screen
television for an hour is not a trivial task (Gilbert and Gra!-Zivin, ming, (forthcoming)).
There are several examples showing the e!ect of salience: Automatic bill payment is used
by many households, often as a way to reduce the need to remember to pay the bill each
month, and therefore to automatically reduce or eliminate any attention paid to utility bills.
In a residential electricity study Sexton (forthcoming) finds that automatic bill pay reduces
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salience of electricity prices and increases electricity use by 5%, on average.53 Gilbert and
Gra!-Zivin (forthcoming) find that households do reduce electricity consumption within a
few days following receipt of their monthly electricity bill, but consumption increases over
the course of the billing period as the salience of the most recent monthly bill diminishes.
The utility literature, with respect to non-linear rate structures, often gleans insights from
the tax literature since many common tax structures are non-linear (e.g., income taxes).
In a laboratory experiment using income tax tables, de Bartolome (1995) find that some
participants clearly use their average tax rate rather than the marginal tax rate, a result
which is at least partly due to the ease of the average rate calculation over the marginal
rate calculation. In two separate field experiments, Chetty et al. (2009) find that the more
salient the tax, the lower the resulting consumption level. The authors show this in the first
experiment by illustrating that included sales tax in the posted price reduces consumption; in
the second experiment they show that increases in excises taxes that are included in posted
prices result in greater reductions in consumption than in sales taxes that are only added at
the register (Chetty et al., 2009).
Water and energy prices are also likely to be less salient for many consumers since the
weight of expenditures on utilities is low relative to overall household spending in a given
month. Strong and Smith (2010): “Utilities are typically associated with a small fraction of
a budget. Small price changes in any one of them are unlikely to induce large reallocation of
income among all goods. This feature of demand can compound the di"culties in estimating
household demand. The e!ects of small price changes may primarily induce reallocation of
the expenditures on household utilities.” Noting that many utility bills contain only a total
53Finkelstein (2009) finds that when drivers use electronic toll collection mechanisms, the toll become less
salient and drivers become less sensitive, in terms of driving, to the toll price.
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bill amount Jordan (2011) posits that households may respond to last month’s bill, rather
than their marginal price or even average price. “If consumers respond to more to the
total amount of the bill rather than any one item, the use of water pricing along to provide
conservation incentives may become less e!ective” (Jordan, 2011). This particular driver
of the salience problem is not addressed in this study as it would require quite detailed
household-level data on income and non-utility expenditures. For this study, however, I do
identify and analyze a new reason that likely renders water and energy prices less salient to
consumers where a single utility delivers all utility services: combined utility bills.
Literature on the e!ect of combined bills is quite limited. To my knowledge, the ‘bill
bundling’ literature often consists of analysis of markets where multiple goods and services
are bundled into one product, and the price of any individual good or service is less if
purchased in a bundle than if the consumer were to purchase it a la carte (e.g., cable-internet-
telephone bundles, season tickets, value meals, travel packeges, etc.). In this context, Soman
and Gourville (2001) do a study of transaction decoupling and find that price bundling “often
can and should decrease price sensitivity and increase purchase likelihood.”
There are some similarities between the gap between benefits and costs that exist in the
ex post billing world of water and energy utility services and credit cards. In an article on
mental accounting, Thaler (1999) notes how when a given good or services is paid for via
credit card, the payment will be bundled in with a number of other payments. When a bill
contains multiple items, the e!ect of any individual purchase will lose salience. Because of
this lack of association between the price paid for each product and the benefit associated
with that product, the adverse impact of the payment is diminished (Soman and Gourville,
2001). Soman (2003) shows that the degree of payment transparency for a given payment
85
mechanism is positively related to the “pain of paying” and negatively related to consumption
levels. In another study on the e!ect of payment mechanisms, Prelec and Simester (2001)
find that willingness-to-pay for sports tickets increased when customers were instructed to
use credit cards (rather than cash). Similarly, when a monthly utility bill arrives, it is near
impossible to parse out the cost of any given water or energy-using activity that contributed
to the final bill.
4.3. Empirical Models
4.3.1. Baseline Model
I begin with a baseline model of water demand to provide evidence of di!erences in
price responsiveness across bill types. I use average price rather than marginal price since
the literature on this complex decision-making environment largely supports that this is the
price signal households respond to, if any (Ito, 2014; Wichman, 2014; Kahn and Wolak,
2013). I use the lagged average price as the most recent price information will be from the
previous bill (Arbués et al., 2003; Renwick and Archibald, 1998; Bushnell and Mansur, 2005;
Wichman, 2014; Ito, 2014). Also, it can be argued that lagging the price variable address
the fact that the average price and water use are co-determined when a household faces a
non-linear rate structure. The log-log functional form is similar as models in Shin (1985);
Nieswiadomy and Molina (1991); Taylor et al. (2004); Chetty et al. (2009), among others.
The basic model is specified as follows, where subscript i denotes household i and subscript
t denotes month t. X is a vector of exogenous control variables; see Table 4.1 for definitions.
ln(wi,t) = " + #1ln(APi,t!1) + %(X)it + &it(10)
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I use this baseline model to first illustrate the di!erence in responsiveness to the water
price signal when there are di!erent numbers and combinations of services on a single utility
bill.
4.3.2. Salience Model
There are a variety of reasons why the price of water may not be salient to the households
making consumption decisions. In this model, I estimate the extent to which the salience of
water price signals may be dampened if water consumption does not contribute much to the
total utility bill. I test how the responsiveness to the lagged average price of water varies
with the proportion of the total utility bill that stems from water services. My hypothesis is
that as the proportion of the bill attributable to water services increases, price responsiveness
will also increase. The salience model is specified as follows, where subscript i again denotes
household i and subscript t denotes month t. X is a vector of exogenous control variables;
see Table 4.1 for definitions.





+ %(X)it + &it(11)
The coe!ecient on the lagged average price (#1) will be the “base” price elasticity, and
the coe"cient on the interaction term (#2) will be the price elasticity “adjustment factor.”
To determine the overall price elasticity, add the base elasticity to the water bill to total bill
ratio times the adjustment factor. I first run this model with household level fixed e!ects
across each of the bill types. Second, since the majority of households have Tri-bills, I use
this subset to model four di!erent specifications of the salience model. In two specifications
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I control for household heterogeneity with household-specific fixed e!ects; in the other two
I control for this with more granular zip code dummy variables and the low-to-high outdoor
water use categorical variable. I also illustrate the e!ect of instrumenting for prices, which
as noted above may not be needed given that the price variables are lagged.
4.4. Data
A large Western municipal utility provided household-level, monthly consumption and
billing data from January 2000 through June 2010. This particular utility is somewhat unique
in that it provides water services, electricity services and natural gas services. Customers
may subscribe to any combination of these services, and all services are billed through a
single monthly bill. Since this analysis focuses on water use, customers in this subset of
the population fall into one of three categories: ‘tri-bill’ if they receive all three services,
‘dual-bill’ if they receive water and either electricity or natural gas, and ‘single-bill’ if they
only receive water.54 In the Western U.S., all households use water and electricity, only some
use natural gas, too. As such, households that have tri-bills (receive water, electricity and
natural gas through the utility) or an electric-water dual-bills likely do not get any other
water or energy services from other providers.55 Those households that do not get water or
electricity from this particular utility likely live in a particular area that falls in the service
area of another electricity or water provider. Therefore, the monthly billing records of water-
only or water-natural gas dual-bills are incomplete; we do not observe their use or their bills
of any services supplied by other providers. There may be unobservable di!erences across
54Note that the ’single-bill’ type does not mean that the household does not use electricity or natural gas,
but rather that they do not receive these services from the Utility that provided the data.
55While this is likely true, there is a possibility that some electric-water dual-bill households get natural
gas services from another provider.
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households with di!erent combinations of bills. The majority of customers, approximately
88% of all observations in the initial data set, subscribe to all three services.
There are some analysis limitations that are a function of the data. The data has been
stripped of any identifying information, save for the zip code and a household identification
number. As such, individual level household demographic or socio-economic information is
not included. While I can control for household-variation through household fixed e!ects,
I cannot individually identify the e!ect of variables like income, house size, lawn size, or
a number of other variables that would help to explain water demand. Also, though there
is significant variation in prices across time, I cannot test the e!ect of implementing the
increasing block rate structure on price responsiveness or price salience, as it was intro-
duced along with non-price policies and media attention of drought conditions. In general,
a huge challenge to estimating relationship between price and quantity demanded is the
non-experimental natural of utility pricing (Nataraj and Hanemann, 2011).
I limit the data to households with a minimum water consumption of 133 cubic feet
(cf), and a maximum of 10,000 cf. This ensures observations where people are continuously
living in the home during the billing period, and eliminates extreme outliers where perhaps
a leak lead to such inadvertently high levels of consumption. Average winter water use is
around 800 cf, and average summer water use is around 3000 cf. The service area of this
utility experienced a significant drought starting in 2002 and extending through 2005. The
utility initially implemented voluntary watering restrictions, but in 2003 turned to mandatory
watering restrictions. As the drought intensity eventually lessened, the utility went back to
voluntary restrictions starting at the end of 2005. In this case, mandatory restrictions on
residential customers consist of limits on the time of day and the number of days a household
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can water outdoors in a given week. This utility enacted three levels of mandatory restrictions
over time that reflect the varying intensity of drought conditions; watering was limited to
either one, two or three days a week. I do not include yearly dummies or other dummies
that might encompass all years within the drought period or all years post-drought. The
reason for this is that the various restriction variables capture these time periods. Prior to
the drought, there are no restrictions in place. Leading up to the drought, nearly all bill
period days in the Summer of 2002 are under voluntary restrictions. During the drought,
nearly all bill period days are under some type of mandatory restrictions. After the drought,
nearly all bill period days are under voluntary restrictions. Table 4.1 contains definitions of
all variables used in this study.
Table 4.1. Definition of Variables
Variable Definition
w water consumption in cubic feet 56
AP Average Price (including fixed costs) of Water 57
#BPdays Number of days in the billing period
BlockRate Dummy; = 1 if increasing block rate structure in place
02Volun % of days in BP under Summer 2002 voluntary restrictions
OneDayRestrict % of days in BP under 1 day only watering mandatory restrictions
TwoDayRestrict % of days in BP under 2 days only watering mandatory restrictions
ThreeDayRestrict % of days in BP under 3 days only watering mandatory restrictions
0506Volun % of days in BP under voluntary restrictions starting Summer 2005
Wbill Water bill
Tbill Total bill58
MaxTemp Maximum temperature in $F
Precip Inches of precipitation
Unemp 6-month moving average of the unemployment rate
LowtoHigh Categorical variable (1-7) of low to high outdoor water users59
56Water consumption is measured in cubic feet (cf); for reference, 1 cubic foot of water is approximately
7.5 gallons of water.
57Average price for an observation is calculated as the total water bill divided by total water consumption.
58Total bill consists of all charges for the combination of utility services subscribed to; may include water,
electricity and/or natural gas services
59A value of 1 indicates very low outdoor water use, whereas a value of 7 indicates that the household is
among the highest outdoor water users. See Table B.1 in the Appendix for how these categories are defined.
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Table 4.2 presents some summary statistics of the variables in the model. A billing period
is typically about 30 days. The mean value for the block rate structure dummy indicates
that 55% of the observations were during months when an IBR was in place. This area of
the United States is quite arid as indicated by an average precipitation of just over one inch
per month. The Table 4.2 also presents some specifics on water consumption, water bills and
total bills by the combined bill type. Note that average water consumption, and therefore
the average water bill, does not vary much across bill types. There is significant variation
in the amount of total bills and therefore the proportion of the total bill driven by water
services. On average, Tri-bills have the highest total utility bills and also the lowest ratio
of water bill to total bill. Average utility bills are more similar for the dual-bill households,
though electric-water dual bills tend to be slightly higher.
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Table 4.2. Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Min Max
#BP days 30 26 35
BlockRate 0.55 0 1
MaxTemp 63.4$ F 33.6$ F 92.5$ F
Precip 1.14” 0” 8.19”
Tri-Bills
w (cf) 1291 134 10,000
Wbill $32.17 $6.19 $766.40
Tbill $155.58 $25.11 $1197.57
Wbill/Tbill 0.219 0.015 0.910
Electric & Water Bills
w (cf) 1290 134 9,572
Wbill $33.97 $6.72 $360.36
Tbill $110.28 $11.00 $635.95
Wbill/Tbill 0.311 0.037 0.915
Natural Gas & Water Bills
w (cf) 1,293 144 8,240
Wbill $33.50 $7.04 $445.67
Tbill $95.82 $18.21 $618.28
Wbill/Tbill 0.396 0.037 0.960
Water Only Bills
w (cf) 1076 133 9,463
Wbill $28.78 $6.40 $462.06
Tbill $28.78 $6.40 $462.06
Wbill/Tbill 1 1 1
4.4.1. Price Variation
Figure 4.1 provides an illustration of the variation in the volumetric water rates over the
time span of the data set for a few levels of water consumption. In response to drought
conditions and changes in state-level recommendations about rate structures, the first three-
tier increasing block rate structure was put in place beginning in July 2002. From 2002
through 2005, the IBR was only in place from May to October, with a constant marginal
price in place the rest of the months. Starting in May of 2006, the block rate structure is
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implemented place year-round. There are fixed fees as part of the water bill. These are
constant charges assessed on a per-day basis, i.e., the only variation in the fixed cost portion
of a bill stems from the number of days in the billing period. These fees range from 14 cents






































































































































































History of Variable Rate Changes Only:!





Figure 4.1. Rate Changes
Figure 4.2 illustrates how marginal price, average price, and average price without fixed
costs varies across di!erent levels of water consumption. The top graph is an example from
the first series of block rate structures, when the IBR was in place only during summer
months. The block 1 boundary is at 999 cf and the block 2 boundary is at 2999 cf. The
second graph illustrates the year-round IBR that began in 2006; now the second block
boundary is at 2499 cf. For consumption levels within the first block, average price is
notably higher than marginal price. Average price without fixed costs is exactly equal to
marginal price. For consumption beyond the first block boundary, average price is always
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less than the marginal price. Also, average price calculated with and without fixed costs are
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Figure 4.2. Price Comparisons
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4.4.2. Bill Variation
The portion of the total utility bill attributable to water services varies noticeably
throughout the year; see Figures 4.3 and 4.4 for the variation across Tri-Bill households.
This water proportion clearly increases during the summer months. The electricity portion
tends to stay the same year-round, with a slight increase in the summer months, likely due
to air conditioning use. Natural gas use is quite low during the summer, and is largest during
winter months as homes in this area heat with natural gas. The total bill itself varies quite
a bit across months. For this particular part of the United States, bills are highest in the
winter months and lowest in the ‘shoulder’ months, like May and September, when there is
very little outdoor water use yet temperatures are such that neither heating or cooling is sig-
nificantly necessary. These graphs illustrate why responsiveness to water prices is typically
found to be greater in the summer months than the winter months, but still may not be
elastic. While the proportion of the total bill attributable to water consumption increases,
the total utility bill decreases, which may render lower price responsiveness to utilities in
general.
Figures 4.5 and 4.6 provide the breakdowns for the electricity and water dual-bills. Notice
that for these households, the bill has less of a summer-winter seasonality to it. Also, the
electricity bill is on average greater than 50% in every month. Figures 4.7 and 4.8 provide the
breakdowns for the natural gas and water dual-bills. These bills have a very clear seasonal
pattern. The water bill portion typically is greater than half during the summer months,






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 4.8. Natural Gas & Water Dual-Bill Variation (B)
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4.5. Results
As shown in Table 4.3, the baseline model results provide initial evidence of di!erences
in price elasticity across bill types. Those households who only receive water services from
this utility have the highest price elasticity. Households with two or three services on their
single bill exhibit less price responsiveness. We would expect that households with all three
services on one bill would be less responsive to the price of water; however, this is not the
case. Dual-bill households with natural gas are more responsive to the price of water than
dual-bill households with electricity. This may be because charges for water consumption
are on average always less than electricity charges for households with electric-water dual
bills (see Figures 4.5 and 4.6), and thus these households may be more responsive to the
electricity portion of their bills. Full model results can be found in Table B.2 in the Chapter
4 Appendix.
Table 4.3. Elasticity estimates without adjustment factor across Bill Type
Price Elasticity
Tri-Bill -0.758
Water & Electricity -0.596
Water & Natural Gas -0.642
Water Only -0.956
Price Elasticity estimates presented only; all
estimates presented are significant at the 1%
level.
4.5.1. Salience Model Results
Referring back to the summary statistics in Table 4.2, average water consumption is not
notably di!erent across bill types. Yet, in the baseline results above, there is evidence of
di!erent price responsiveness across bill types. Using the salience model, I illustrate that
the portion of the total bill stemming from water services a!ects water price responsiveness.
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Table 4.4 presents the results for the tri-bill population across four di!erent specifications
of the salience model. These specifications represent various ways to control for household-
level heterogeneity as well as ways to account for possible endogeneity in the co-determination
of consumption and average price. The fixed e!ect (FE) specifications controls for household
heterogeneity with household-level fixed e!ects. The instrumental variables (IV) specifica-
tions instrument for both the base price variable and the interaction term; the instruments
are the parameters of the water block rate structure, including fixed charge per day and the
marginal prices of each block, as well as fixed charges per day for electricity and natural
gas. The IV specification without fixed e!ects includes zip code dummy variables as well as
the low-to-high categorical variable, which controls for di!erent levels of outdoor water use.
Ignoring the IV component for a moment, the results are similar between specifications (1)
to (2) and the results are similar between specifications from (3) to (4). This suggests that
when a researcher does not have observations attributed to a specific household, controlling
for di!erences across observations using more granular variables (like zip code) may be a
reliable alternative. While the magnitude varies across specifications, the story remains the
same.
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Table 4.4. Salience Model Results
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: ln(wit) OLS FE IV FE+IV
ln(APi,t!1) -1.072 -0.536 -0.188 -0.172
(.004)*** (.004)*** (.010)*** (.008)***
ln(APi,t!1)' (Wbilli,t!1/Tbilli,t!1) -0.672 -0.617 -0.281 -0.302
(.002)*** (.002)*** (.023)*** (.018)***
#BP days 0.040 0.041 0.042 0.042
(.001)*** (.001)*** (.001)*** (.001)***
BlockRate -0.039 -0.046 -0.067 -0.067
(.003)*** (.002)*** (.003)*** (.002)***
02Volun -0.534 -0.346 -0.129 -0.137
(.007)*** (.006) (.010)*** (.008)***
OneDayRestrict -0.145 -0.119 -0.120 -0.123
(.002) (.002)** (.004)*** (.003)***
TwoDayRestrict -0.149 -0.105 -0.087 -0.091
(.003)*** (.003)*** (.004)*** (.003)***
ThreeDayRestrict -0.018 -0.030 -0.045 -0.050
(.004)*** (.003) (.005)*** (.003)***
0506Volun 0.084 -0.131 -0.089 -0.095
(.003)*** (.002) (.004)** (.003)***
MaxTemp 0.010 0.012 0.017 0.017
(.001)*** (.001)*** (.003)*** (.001)***
Precip -0.042 -0.050 -0.050 -0.051
(.001)*** (.001)*** (.001)*** (.001)***
Unemp 0.066 0.023 -0.003 -0.005
(.001)*** (.000)*** (.001)*** (.001)***
constant 0.071 2.441 3.389 3.876
(525.4) (.020)*** (.367)*** (.033)***
Month Dummies
Zip Code Dummies
R2 0.6527 0.5846 0.5597 0.4779
n = 497384 (groups = 4291)
Standard errors are in parentheses.
*, **, *** denotes p-values of 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 respectively.
Both price-related variables are instrumented for using the parameters of the water block
rate structure, including fixed charge per day and the marginal prices of each block, as well
as fixed charges per day for electricity and natural gas.
Responsiveness to the lagged average price of water is a function of the proportion of the
total bill attributable to water services. As shown in Table 4.5, the base price elasticity ranges
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from "0.172 to "1.072 and the adjustment factor varies from "0.281 to "0.672, depending
on the model specification. Regardless, the larger the bill portion that is attributable to
water services, the larger the price responsiveness. These results resonate with the existing
literature and anecdotal evidence, by showing that household responsiveness to water prices is
inelastic (range is typically between "0.3 and "0.7), and that households are less responsive
as water services contribute less to their overall utility bill expenditures (Arbués et al., 2003).
Regardless of specification, there is consistency across the coe"cients of the other vari-
ables included. They are also of the expected sign and are statistically significant. An
additional day in the billing period, increases water consumption by around 4%. Mandatory
restrictions reduce water consumption. The presence of a block rate structure reduces water
consumption by 4.4%, on average. Higher levels of precipitation reduce water use, whereas
higher average maximum temperatures increase water use. These weather results are likely
largely driven by variation across summer months.
Table 4.5 boils down the essential information from the results in Table 4.4. The first
column of elasticities are the base elasticities from each of the four specifications. The second
column contains the adjustment factor. Using the minimum, mean, and maximum water
bill proportions found in Table 4.2, I calculated the price elasticities for each category across
each specification. This illustrates the range of elasticities, given the range of the proportion
of the total bill driven by water charges.
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Table 4.5. Elasticity Estimates: Tri-Bills Only
Based on Water Bill Proportions
Specification Base Elasticity Adjustment Factor Min Mean Max
(1) -1.072 -0.672 -1.082 -1.218 -1.6835
(2) -0.536 -0.617 -0.545 -0.671 -1.097
(3) -0.188 -0.281 -0.192 -0.250 -0.444
(4) -0.172 -0.301 -0.176 -0.240 -0.446
Min, Mean and Max water bill proportions can be found the the summary statistics table.
Sample calculation for specification (1) overall elasticity:
As discussed in the literature, some authors use lagged prices to address the co-determination
of contemporaneous price and consumption variables because lagged price variables do not
co-determine current water consumption. Other authors use instrumental variables to ad-
dress the issue. Given that the literature suggests that households respond to lagged average
price, this is the price variable used in this study. I present the results with and without the
IV technique to illustrate the impact on the estimates. Using IV results in a significantly
smaller base price elasticity and adjustment factor. The first stage of the IV process predicts
just under 60% of the variation in the price variables (base elasticity and the adjustment
factor). Using the IV technique tends to result in smaller estimates and generally larger
standard errors. Given that lagging prices is a means to account for co-determination and
that estimates without the IV technique fall in line better with existing estimates, the fixed
e!ects specification is likely the most appropriate.
Moving forward, I employ specification (2) only. I do this for a two main reasons: First,
given that we have household identifiers for each observation and little other household-
specific data, then household-level fixed e!ects will be a more valuable way to control for
household heterogeneity than the broader zip code dummy variable approach. Second, with
the smaller number of observations across the remaining bill types, and given that there is
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support for lagging average price as a reasonable means to address any endogeneity, there is
no pressing need for instrumental variables. Table 4.6 presents only the estimates for the price
variables for across each bill type. Along with the base elasticity and the adjustment factor,
I include the range of overall elasticities for each bill type based on the minimum, mean
and maximum proportion of the total bill stemming from water charges.60 These results
maintain the patterns across bill type found above, but highlight the range of elasticities
once we account for varying price salience from the combined bill. Full model results can be
found in Table B.3 in the Chapter 4 Appendix.
Table 4.6. Estimates across Bill Type
Overall Elasticity
Base Elasticity Adjustment Factor Min Mean Max
Tri-Bill -0.536 -0.617 -0.545 -0.671 -1.097
Water & Electricity -0.293 -0.449 -0.309 -0.432 -0.704
Water & Natural Gas -0.467 -0.319 -0.487 -0.602 -0.782
Water Only -0.959 N/A -0.959 -0.959 -0.959
Estimates are from the Salience Model run with household level fixed e!ects, but no IV. All
estimates presented are significant at the 1% level.
Min, Mean and Max water bill proportions can be found the the summary statistics table.
Sample calculation: "0.536 + ("0.617) ( (0.219) = "0.671 = Tri-Bill overall elasticity for the
mean bill ratio
Table 4.6 illustrates that there are indeed di!erences in responsiveness across bill types;
the range in estimates across bill type echoes the preliminary results presented in Table4.3.
Households receiving only a separate water bill are the most responsive, with the exception
of tri-bill households whose bill is over 90% driven by water consumption. Households paying
tri-bills that look like this might be the most responsive to water prices because most of the
bill is driven by water use, and the average total bill for tri-bill households is greater that
total bills for households only subscribing to water services. Tri-bill households exhibit a
60See the summary statistics (Table 4.2) for the specific ratios.
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wider range of responsiveness than the other bill types, which is in part because the majority
of customers in this dataset are tri-bill households. There is naturally going to be greater
heterogeneity across this group.
For the gas-water dual bills, responsiveness to water is on average higher than for house-
holds receiving electric-water dual bills. On average, households with only gas and water
services tend to have natural gas use dominate their bills in the winter, and water use domi-
nate the bill in the summer. For households with only electricity and water services, electric
bill is on average always more than half of the total utility bill, regardless of the season.
During the summer months, total bills tend to be lower for natural gas-water dual bill and
tri-bill households, whereas electric-water dual bill households’ total bills tends to be lowest
in the shoulder months (April-May; September-October). When the total bill is on average
lower while the water proportion is usually higher, like it is for natural gas-water dual bills
and tri-bill households, the water price signal is more salient (because the other services are
lower and less significant drivers of expenditures). This also may explain why electric-water
dual bill households are less responsive to water prices; they may be more responsive to
electricity prices instead. Finally, both dual bill types are less responsive than tri-bill types
because tri-bill totals tend to be larger than either of the dual bill totals.
4.6. Conclusion
This study provides new evidence explaining residential responsiveness to water prices.
The analysis shows that the informational environment of the utility bill and the salience
of the water price driven by the water bill contribute to varying levels of responsiveness.
Responsiveness varies by the number and type of services bill through the single utility
bill. Responsiveness to the lagged average price of water is a function of the proportion of
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the total utility bill stemming from water services. Households may be thinking of utilities
as a combined area of expenditure, especially since they only see a single bill. Given the
pattern of energy and water use over the course of a year, it may be that households are
responding to higher utility bills by reducing energy or natural gas consumption instead of
water consumption. While we cannot expect that a utility will switch its billing process to
individual bills per service, the results do highlight why household responsiveness to water
prices may be inelastic and what drive some of the variation. If the utility desires greater
responsiveness to water price, they will need to make the price signal more salient. With
greater use of smart meter technology, online web portals and in-home displays, there are
many opportunities on the horizon for communicating consumption and prices to consumers.




This collection of research provides new evidence on how the informational setting in-
fluences household water and energy use decision-making. Water and energy use fit into a
category of decision-making that is quite complex, though not wholly unique to these goods.61
There are many reasons to expect decision-making in this environment to not perfectly con-
form to the assumptions nor the results of rational decision-making theory. Households make
choices armed with imperfect, infrequent information and face uncertainty (and/or do not
easily have access to information) about how much they are consuming and what prices they
face. This research has investigated how the timing of information can reduce uncertainty
and a!ect consumption choices, how the e!ect of the timing of information changes under
di!erent price structures and, how a combined bill for multiple services dampens the price
signal of any individual service.
As discussed in the Introductory Chapter, there exists a pressing need to manage use
of natural resources more e"ciently and e!ectively. The two major environmental issues
addressed here are (1) increasing greenhouse gas emissions and, (2) increasing variability
and scarcity of water. Households contribute to these problems through common, routine
activities like watering their lawns and watching television. Supply expansion of energy and
water resources is limited and contains serious environmental trade-o!s.62 To meet future
needs, utilities need demand-side management (DSM) policies to result in more reliable and
consistent consumer responsiveness. However, it is clear that most households do not know
61The decision-making environment present here can apply to energy use, healthcare, cell phone use,
credit cards, and labor supply.
62Expanding supplies is increasingly less reliable, more regulated, and more taxing on the environment.
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how much energy or water they consume, do not know the prices they face, and do not know
the best way to reduce use. Given the existing technology and infrastructure, households do
not have the information or tools to e!ectively manage their consumption or the resulting
costs. By improving the informational environment surrounding household water and energy
use, there will be great capacity for households to use water and energy more e"ciently and
ultimately make choices that will help reduce the severity of climate change and water issues.
Consumers need to have greater control over consumption and costs. The United States
government sees the smart grid as a means to modernize the U.S. electricity transmission
and distribution system, which involves the “integration of ’smart’ appliances and consumer
devices” as well as “provision to consumers of timely information and control options” (Con-
gress, 2007).63 The Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 notes that “for the United
States to realize its full [energy] demand response potential, customers must have access to,
and a better understanding of, information about real-time or near-real-time prices” (Con-
gress, 2007). Though much of the focus is currently on the role of advanced metering
infrastructure (AMI) technology in the electricity industry, there is increasing installation
of AMI on the water side, too (John, 2012). Historically, water utilities tend to lag, but
eventually follow, the direction of electric utilities.
In order for utilities to forecast demand, predict revenue streams, and plan for long-
term capital projects, they need to know how their customers respond to price. The costs
of addressing aging infrastructure and future supply development will definitely lead to
increases in retail prices. For example, Parkville Water District in Leadville, Colorado is
increasing the fixed charge portion and the price of each block in their tier rate structure; from
63Though much of the attention is on smart grid development in the energy sector, there is growth on
the water side, too. See the summarizing article: John (2012). Historically, water utilities tend to lag, but
eventually follow, the direction of electric utilities.
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their recent press release: “The rate increase is necessary to keep up with expenses, he [Greg
Teter, Parkville general manager] said. The district would like to put away something in a
capital-reserve fund, but its hard to project what the expenses will be each year. Parkville
is looking at $500,000 in capital expenses this year as it deals with 130-year-old water lines
and 120-year-old dams, Teter said” (Martinek, 2014).
In areas like the Western United States, nearly every utility has a set of policies designed
to reduce consumption. Conservation pricing policies can be used to e!ectively influence
consumption if people have better information about quantity, rate structures and prices.
As noted by Jessoe et al. (2013), there is “a recent tendency for electricity and water regula-
tors to eschew market-based approaches in favor of non-market instruments. Electric utilities
have made social pressure a cornerstone of recent energy conservation e!orts and federal au-
thorities rely heavily on e"ciency standards. To respond to droughts, water authorities tend
to use non-pecuniary approaches (Olmstead and Stavins 2009). And while these programs
have been shown to achieve conservation (Allcott 2011b, Ferraro and Price 2011), under full
information policymakers should view price as an e!ective tool to achieve their objective.”
As more dynamic pricing systems are put in place, information and ‘smart’ technology will
be critical in enabling customers to respond e"ciently, reduced the system demand (peak de-
mand) by reducing their own demand (and their own bills). Utilities need to provide “timely
and actionable information to consumers in order to maximize the e!ectiveness of nonlin-
ear retail price schemes” (Kahn and Wolak, 2013). This dissertation shows how important
the informational setting is: Without the proper level of information and understanding,
economic incentives may be less e!ective. Improving information may increasing e"ciency,
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reduce consumption, reduce or put o! long term supply expansion. Utilities can use tech-
nology like smart meters to render existing and developing DSM programs more e!ective,
and result in a greater impact that under the less certain, less informed world.
Each chapter of this dissertation addresses an aspect of the informational setting in the
decision-making environment characterizing household water and energy use. In Chapter
2, I present a theoretical model of decision-making under quantity uncertainty. While a
household knows the benefit they receive from setting the thermostat to a comfortable tem-
perature, they do not know the energy requirement nor the cost of this choice. The expected
utility model describes an individual making multiple consumption choices over a billing pe-
riod where the benefit of is known at the time of consumption but the input requirement and
therefore the total cost is not known. This individual faces two types of quantity uncertainty:
‘backward uncertainty,’ since it is di"cult or inconvenient to know total consumption up to
any given point in the period, and ‘forward uncertainty,’ because the household is unlikely
to know how much they will consume throughout the remainder of the period. As a result,
when making decisions within a bill period, consumers are unaware of how much they have
consumed to that point and how much they are likely to consume, in total, throughout
the period. I show how consumption decisions in total and within the period change when
backward quantity uncertainty is removed.
These results depend on risk preferences and the rate structure in place. In general, risk
averse individuals will, all else equal, increase consumption when backward uncertainty is
removed, whereas risk seeking individuals will reduce consumption instead. When a con-
sumer faces an increasing block rate structure, the presence of quantity uncertainty can lead
to marginal price uncertainty. This alters behavior: for example, an individual who is risk
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neutral but faces a positive probability of total consumption falling in the second block (and
facing a higher marginal price) may appear to act risk averse. Overall, the theoretical model
suggests that consumer behavior depends on 1) the level of uncertainty, which is dictated
by the frequency of information provided within a period, 2) the content of the information
(i.e., the value of the input requirement), 3) the individual’s risk preferences, and 4) the rate
structure.
This theoretical model contributes to the literature on decision-making under uncertainty
in two major ways: First, I model multiple sequential choices within a billing period. Ex-
isting models do not capture this aspect of the decision-making environment; instead they
essentially model the billing period as the unit of decision-making, even in models of sequen-
tial decision-making under uncertainty. In household water and energy use, many choices
are made within the billing period. When the household only receives an end-of-period bill,
they make all of the period’s decisions before any uncertainty is realized. Even when the
uncertainty is realized, the multiple-choice nature of the environment keeps the individual
from knowing the true values of individual input requirement. Second, I allow for a spectrum
of risk preferences. Other models, typically via their choice of functional form, assume the
individual is risk averse or risk neutral. Without allowing for many types of risk preferences,
we would not be able to illustrate the variety of possible sets of choices made with and with-
out uncertainty, especially when facing a non-linear rate structure. While this theoretical
model is designed to illustrate how more frequent feedback may influence household water
and energy use, the findings here can also be applied to any other setting where multiple
decisions are made facing uncertainty and are made prior to realization of cost.
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This model could be extended in a number of ways. It could be adapted to test the
influence of di!erent probability distributions for the uncertain variables. This model could
also be melded with the literature on learning and allow for the potential for the individual
to learn over time, which may better match how household with smart meters will adapt to
this new technology. Finally, while the motivation in water and energy consumption, this
model can be applied to other settings with similar characteristics.
In Chapter 3, I create a computerized laboratory experiment that tests some of the
predictions generated by the expected utility model presented in Chapter 2. The experimen-
tal setting is simplified to an individual making consumption choices under input quantity
uncertainty due to imperfect information. In the computerized laboratory experiment, par-
ticipants are incentivized to maximize profit: a sequence of decisions are made facing either
complete uncertainty about input requirements or only forward uncertainty if the individual
receives feedback on her input use resulting from previous decisions within the period. The
feedback e!ect is tested under three rate structure treatments: a constant marginal price
structure and two versions of a two-tier increasing block rate structure.
Results show that more frequent feedback increased average consumption, increased vari-
ance in weekly output levels and lowered price responsiveness, independent of rate structure.
Results from the IBR sessions suggest that the e!ect of prices and the block boundary de-
pend on the distribution of user preferences relative to the block boundary. Participants
with preferences consistent with expected use below (above) boundary increased (decreased)
use. There was notable heterogeneity in the decision-making of participants, which can par-
tially be explained by di!erences in risk preferences and gender. Using estimates of risk
preferences elicited through a Holt and Laury (2002) lottery, I find that risk averse and risk
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neutral participants are positively responsive to feedback and more price responsive than
risk seeking participants.64 I also find evidence of rate structure induced risk behavior in the
IBR sessions (i.e., risk neutral participants acting like they are risk averse due to the positive
probability of facing a higher marginal price). This behavior sometimes makes participants
appear to target the block boundary, however, the risk preferences explanation fits the data
better. Finally, female participants are more responsive to feedback than their male coun-
terparts, a result which is interestingly independent of the other experiment treatments and
risk preferences.
Though the Department of Energy is taking the steps to encourage more utilities to in-
stall AMI system, few utilities have yet to take advantage of the utility-to-household smart
meter communication opportunities and even where this data exists, program implementa-
tion often confounds clear analysis and privacy laws make it di"cult to study household level
data. Beyond these barriers to accessing real world data, it is di"cult and costly to apply
di!erent treatments (like di!erent bill design, bill frequency or prices) to di!erent subsets
of customers. An experiment is a great way to test economic theories without disrupting
real world activities; this tool can be used before incurring the risk and expense of a real
world application or field test. The experiment can shed light on unintended results or con-
sequences and suggest factors that should be considered in final policy design (Croson 2005).
The results give insight into how water consumers may respond to more frequent informa-
tion, and provide guidance to design and implementation of utility demand-side policies. I
am not aware of any previous studies that have considered the e!ect of resolving backward
64The expected utility model developed in the conceptual framework section predicts much of the risk-
preference related behavior seen in the experiment.
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uncertainty in a controlled experimental setting or the impact of information under alter-
native pricing schemes. This work complements a growing literature on price and quantity
salience, as well as household water and energy use.
There are a variety of ways to extend the research presented in Chapter 3. First, ele-
ments of the experimental design could be changed to test the e!ect. For example, in most
economic experiments, participants earn money based on their decisions within the experi-
ment, otherwise the experiment is not incentive compatible. I argue that since participants
typically expect to earn some amount of money for their time, that it does not perfectly
match up with reality. I would like to explore how experiment incentive structure where par-
ticipants perceive to be losing money rather than gaining money influences decision-making,
specifically under uncertainty. Another example would be to explore the frequency of feed-
back more. What is the optimal frequency of providing updated information? Finally, like
the theoretical model, this experiment could be adjusted to explore the role of learning.
Another possible extension would be to test the e!ect of combinations of policies and
incentives. What is the optimal combination of price and non-price policies (like informa-
tion)? For example, how does the combination of social norm-related energy use messaging
and dynamic time-of-use pricing a!ect energy use? What is the optimal frequency of feed-
back given a utility’s overall or a household’s personal consumption goals? While research
on price and non-pricing policies can inform questions in household energy and water use, it
can also easily extend to other economic applications.
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Finally, given the initial evidence of heterogeneity in decision-making under uncertainty,
it would be of interest to find ways to identify di!erent types of decision-makers and di!er-
ent types of households. For example, results from the experiment suggest that the socio-
demographics of who in a household pays the utility bills and influences water and energy
consumption decisions matters. Identifying di!erent segments of a population will help
identify how policies will impact welfare and responsiveness at a more refined level.
In Chapter 4, I explore the role of billing for multiple utility services through a single
monthly bill. I test the hypothesis that household responsiveness to the price of a water is
influenced by the number of other services on the bill and the proportion of the total bill
driven by water charges. I find di!erences in responsiveness when there are di!erent numbers
and combinations of utility services billed on the single bill. For example, households only
subscribing to electricity and water services are less price responsive than households who
only receive natural gas and water services from the Utility. Households only receiving a bill
with water charges on it are typically the most responsive to price. Through an empirical
model of price salience, I find that responsiveness to water prices increases as the proportion
of the total bill attributable to water services increases. Households pay more attention
to water prices, when their water use contributes to a greater portion of their total utility
spending. This study provides additional support of households being generally inelastic,
but not unresponsive, with respect to water prices. Given this unique data set I am able to
provide evidence of how di!erent combinations of bills, and the varying proportion of a bill
attributable to water, a!ects water responsiveness.
There is evidence that household water demand is inelastic but not unresponsive with
respect to water prices. Responsiveness is influenced by the salience of the given price
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signal, the relative weight of those charges within total utility spending and the combination
of services billed through a single monthly bill. If a utility desires greater responsiveness to
water price, they will need to make the price signal more salient. With greater use of smart
meter technology, online web portals and in-home displays, there are many opportunities on
the horizon for communicating consumption and prices to consumers.
A next step of this study will be to extend analysis to energy responsiveness and cross-
price elasticities. The e!ect of water and energy prices on their respective residential demands
have been studied separately, but little attention has been given to the e!ect of energy
prices on household water use and vice versa (Hansen, 1996).65 There is a direct relationship
between water and energy consumption for a considerable portion of household activities
(e.g., dishwashers and washing machines) and energy for water heating alone accounts for
around 18% of a home’s energy bill (EIA, 2009). There is potential that limiting the scope of
analysis to own-price sensitivity ignores the significant functional connection between water
and energy use and likely generates flawed estimates.66
To my knowledge, only one study has directly acknowledged how electricity and water
prices may impact household demand of either. Hansen (1996) noted that at the time water
use for services where the water is heated accounts for about two-thirds of water use, but
the price of electricity on water demand doesn’t receive much attention. He uses a pooled
time-series approach and finds significant cross-price elasticities and suggests that further
research be conducted for other populations, especially in terms of indoor use. His results
65Arbués et al. (2003) and Worthington and Ho!man (2008) provide good summaries of water demand
modeling, and water own-price elasticity estimates under di!erent price specifications. See Espey and Espey
(2004), Reiss and White (2005) for similar reviews of electricity demand estimation.
66In the Western U.S., these may only be evident during winter months, as during the summer water
use is primarily driven by outdoor irrigation and summer energy use is driven by air conditioning (i.e., hot
weather). However, evidence during the summer may be di"cult to tease out since water consumption is
relatively low in the winter.
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suggest that trends about changing energy prices could have significant impacts on water
demand. The cross-price e!ect may not be easy to study since not many utilities provide
both water and energy services, therefore the data requirements of a household-level study
in this area would be daunting. It would require collection of data from separate utilities,
both of which would be willing to provide household-level identifying information so that the
researcher could connect water and energy consumption observations to the same household.
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Table A.1 presents the summary statistics of the participant characteristics:
Table A.1. Summary Statistics
Participant Characteristics
Average Min Max
Gender (1=female) 0.38 0 1
Age (years) 19.26 18 33
Year in College (1=Freshman) 1.61 1 4
Semesters of Econ Courses 1.27 0 15
A.2. Additional Tables and Figures
Table A.2. Week Output Correlation Coe"cients by Feedback and Producer
Type
Low-Value Producer: No Feedback High-Value Producer: No Feedback
x1 x2 x3 x1 x2 x3
x2 0.442 – – 0.345 – –
x3 0.549 0.461 0.382 0.405 –
x4 0.434 0.596 0.426 0.453 0.536 0.541
Low-Value Producer: Feedback High-Value Producer: Feedback
x1 x2 x3 x1 x2 x3
x2 0.345 – – 0.482 – –
x3 0.382 0.405 – 0.451 0.457 –
x4 0.343 0.345 0.544 0.297 0.453 0.563
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Figure A.1. Example: Correlation Coe"cients across Weekly Output
Choices, with and without Feedback
Table A.3. Relative Strength of Feedback and Price E!ects across Rate
Structures
Partial E!ects on Monthly Input Demand
CMP IBR41 IBR82
Baseline Low Price Dinputs 26.154 29.275 29.538
Marginal E!ects:
Feedback*Low Price†‡ 1.637 1.375 -3.40
(3.377) (2.664) (2.809)
Medium Price Level†‡ -6.773* -9.883*** -8.593***
(3.660) (2.878) (3.034)
Feedback*Medium Price†‡ 2.321 0.650 9.4125***
(1.952) (2.664) (2.809)
High Price Level†‡ -18.059*** -17.676*** -8.578***
(3.509) (2.769) (2.919)
Feedback*High Price†‡ 9.279*** 7.488*** -1.887
(3.377) (2.665) (2.809)
*, **, *** denotes p-values of 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 respectively.
† Estimates from a version of the random e!ects model 8 as seen
in Table 3.4, but with price-feedback interaction terms and the
sample split by rate structure.


















































Low-Value Producers  High-Value Producers 
IBR sessions 
Risk Seeking Risk Neutral Risk Averse 
Figure A.2. Percent Change in Average Input Demand with Feedback
IBR sessions only, Split: Producer Value Type
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Table A.4. Role of Gender
Random E!ects Model
Partial E!ects on Monthly Input Demand
Independent Variable Male Female
Feedback 1.577 5.245***
(1.230) (1.504)
Medium Price Level -4.684*** -8.920***
(1.832) (2.126)














Overall R2 0.5172 0.4430
Standard errors are in parentheses.
*, **, *** denotes p-values of 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 respec-
tively.
Estimates from a version of the random e!ects model 8 as
seen in Table 3.4, but with the sample split by gender.
A.3. Sample Experiment Instructions
You are about to participate in an experiment on the economics of decision-making. This
experiment should take about an hour and a half of your time. This experiment is funded
by the Colorado State University Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics. You
have the opportunity to earn cash, paid to you at the end of the session. Your payout depends
on your decisions and chance: please read the following instructions carefully. Earnings in
this experiment will be in Lab dollars.
X lab dollars = 1 U.S. dollar
During the entire experiment communication of any kind is strictly prohibited. Com-
munication between participants will lead to your exclusion from the experiment and the
forfeit of all earnings. Please raise your hand if you have any questions and a member of the
research team will come to you and answer your questions privately. Also, please silent your
cell phones to minimize disruption during the experiment. Your decisions are not related to
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any of the other participants decisions. You may notice that other participants seem to be
moving faster or slower than you, or may have di!erent looking screens. Your game is com-
pletely independent from other participants, so please proceed at the pace which guarantees
that you are making the best decisions possible.
Experiment Overview and Timeline
In this experiment you are a producer of a single good. You will make decisions regarding
how much of that good to produce. The experiment consists of a series of Months. Each
Month consists of four Weeks. Each week you will have 30 seconds to decide how much of
the good to produce. At the end of each week you will be shown a screen summarizing your
decisions, including the amount of revenue earned based on the number of units of output
produced. An example of this screen will be presented later in the instructions. At the end
of each month you will be billed for the inputs required to produce the good during the
previous four weeks. At the end of each month you will be shown a screen summarizing your
decisions over the previous four weeks. An example of this screen will be presented later in
the instructions.
The revenues you earned, and the costs you incurred, will be used to calculate your total
profit for that month. Total profit in any given month will be calculated as:
Profit = Total Revenue Total Cost
Note that months are independent from each other; your profits will always reset to zero
in Week 1 of every month. Figure A.3 provides a timeline of the experiment:
Month 1 
  Week 1 
Week 2 
  Week 3 



























Timeline of your decisions in the Experiment 
(Note: you make a production decision each week) 
Start Finish 
Figure A.3. Experiment Timeline
At the end of the experiment we will add up all of your profits and convert them into
U.S. dollars using the exchange rate presented above.
The following three sections provide a detailed overview of how revenues and costs will be
calculated.
A. Production Revenues The amount of revenue you earn each week will be based
on how many units you produce. At the beginning of the experiment you will be given a
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Production Revenue Sheet. This sheet will detail the amount of revenue you will earn for
each unit of output produced in a given week. An example Production Revenue Sheet is
included in your packet. Please take out the sheet of paper labeled Example Production
Revenue Sheet at this time.
To better understand how to use your Production Revenue Sheet we will now walk you
through an example using the Example Production Revenue Sheet. For this example as-
sume that you decided to produce 6 units of output in Week 1, 4 in Week 2, 8 in Week 3,
and 2 in Week 4. Table A.5, which is similar to the summary table you will see at the end
of each month, provides a detailed breakdown of the revenue you would earn using the Ex-
ample Production Revenue Sheet. Note: we have intentionally left blank the columns/rows
corresponding to inputs and costs as these will be discussed later.
Table A.5. Example Revenue Calculations
Week Units Produced Total Revenue Input Conditions Inputs per Unit of Output Total Inputs Used
1 6 20+18+16+14+12+10=90
2 4 20+18+16+14= 68
3 8 20+18+16+14+12+10 +8+6=104
4 2 20+18= 38
Total 20 300
Total Revenue for Month is 300 lab dollars.
Total Cost of production is [intentionally left blank]
Your Profit this month is [intentionally left blank]
Note that, in this example, if you produced one more unit of output in Week 1 you would
earn an additional $8. However, if you instead increased production by 1 in Week 4 you
would earn an additional $16.
Alternatively, if you produced one less unit of output in Week 1 your total revenue would
fall by $10. However, if you instead decreased production by 1 in Week 4, your total revenue
would fall by $18.
Important: this is only the revenue component of your overall payo!. You must weigh your
production decisions, which earn you revenue, with the costs you incur when producing
your output. A detailed description of how your costs are calculated is presented in the next
section.
B. Production Costs At the end of each month, the cost to produce each unit of
output will be subtracted from your revenues. The cost of producing is based on the number
of inputs used over the course of the entire month. Note that while revenues are calculated
on a weekly basis, your costs are calculated at the end of each month, based on the total
number of inputs used over the course of the month (the total from all 4 weeks) and the
price of inputs in that month.
Input Requirements
The total amount of inputs you use will depend on the number of goods you produce and
chance. The number of inputs needed to produce a single unit of the good will vary from
week to week. Five di!erent types of input conditions are possible: Very Low, Low, Normal,
High, and Very High. Table A.6 outlines the input requirements and probabilities associated
with each of these conditions that will be used throughout the experiment. On average each
unit of the good produced will require 3 units of input.
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Table A.6. Input Requirements per Unit of Output: Conditions and Probabilities
Input Condition Input Requirement* Probability**




Very High 5 0.2
*Input Requirement: indicates the number of inputs required to produce each unit of output. For
example, if you decide to produce 4 units of the good you will use 4*(Input Requirement). If it was
a Very Low week 4 units of output would require 4 units of input (4*1). By comparison, in a Very
High week producing 4 units of output would require 20 units of the input (4*5).
**The probabilities listed mean that, on average, 2 out of every 10 weeks will have Very Low input
requirements, 2 out of 10 weeks will have Low input requirements, 2 out of 10 will have Normal
input requirements, 2 out of 10 will have High input requirements, and 2 out of 10 will have very
high input requirements. However, the computer chooses randomly, so it is possible to have several
weeks with Very Low (or Very High) input requirements in a row, and the probabilities are the same
in each week, independent of what happened in previous weeks.
To better understand consider again the example from above where you decided to pro-
duce 6 units of output in Week 1, 4 in Week 2, 8 in Week 3, and 2 in Week 4. Table A.7
presents the inputs required assuming input conditions were High in Week 1, Very High in
Week 2, Normal in Week 3, and Very Low in Week 4.
Table A.7. Example Input Calculations
Week Units Produced Total Revenue Input Conditions Inputs per Unit of Output Total Inputs Used
1 6 90 High 4 6*4=24
2 4 68 Very High 5 4*5=20
3 8 104 Normal 3 8*3=24
4 2 38 Very Low 1 2*1=2
Total 20 300 70
Total Revenue for Month is 300 lab dollars.
Total Cost of production is [intentionally left blank]
Your Profit this month is [intentionally left blank]
The input conditions assumed in Table 3 are for illustration purposes only. In the actual
experiment, input requirements will vary from week to week and from the average of 3. You
will not know with certainty the actual input requirements for a given week before you make
your production decision. Depending on chance, in some weeks it will be relatively cheap
to produce your output. In other weeks it will be relatively expensive to produce your output.
Input Costs
The final step to calculating your profit involves subtracting the cost of the inputs you
use in producing your output from the revenues you earn from production.
You will be charged a constant per unit price for each input used. At the beginning of
each month you will be told which price you will face. This price will not change over the
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course of a month, but may di!er from month to month. At the end of each month we will
add up the total number of inputs you used over the course of the previous four weeks and
multiply that number by the input price per unit.
To better understand, consider again the case when you decide to produce 6 units of
output in Week 1, 4 in Week 2, 8 in Week 3, and 2 in Week 4. Table A.8 presents the cost
associated with this level of production given a price of $3 dollars per unit of input and
assuming the same input conditions used in the previous example (i.e. High in Week 1, Very
High in Week 2, Normal in Week 3, and Very Low in Week 4).
Table A.8. Example Cost and Profit Calculation
Week Units Produced Total Revenue Input Conditions Inputs per Unit of Output Total Inputs Used
1 6 90 High 4 24
2 4 68 Very High 5 20
3 8 104 Normal 3 24
4 2 38 Very Low 1 2
Total 20 300 70
Total Revenue for Month is 300 lab dollars.
Total Cost of production is 70*34=210 lab dollars.
Your Profit this month is 300-210=90 lab dollars.
Note that in this example the cost associated with producing one additional unit of out-
put would be di!erent across each of the four weeks. In Week 1, producing 1 additional unit
of output would require 4 units of input; increasing your total costs by 12 dollars (4*3). By
comparison, producing an additional unit of output in Week 4 would require only 1 unit of
input; increasing your total costs by 3 dollar (1*3).
Similarly, the savings associated with producing one less unit of output would also di!er
across each of the four weeks. In Week 1, producing 1 less unit of output would require 4
fewer units of input; decreasing your total costs by 12 dollars (4*3). By comparison, pro-
ducing one less unit of output in Week 4 would require only 1 unit of input; increasing your
total costs by 3 dollars (1*3).
C. Information on Input Requirements
Prior to deciding how many units of output to produce you will not know the input
conditions for that week or for any future weeks. However, in some months we will tell
you how many inputs you needed at the end of each week. i.e. after you have made your
production decision we will tell you what the input conditions were for that week and how
many inputs you have used up to that point in the month. This information will be included
as part of your weekly summary. Figure A.4 provides an example of screen you will see at
the end of each week during those months when this information is provided.
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Figure A.4. Screenshot - with Weekly Feedback
In other months the weekly updates you receive will contain this information; each of the
rows in the “Input Use Summary” and “So far this month” sections will indicate that the
information is not available. In those cases you will have to wait until the end of the month
to learn how many inputs you used in production of your output over the 4 weeks. Figure
A.5 provides an example of screen you will see at the end of each week during those months
when this information is not provided.
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Figure A.5. Screenshot - with Weekly Feedback
At the beginning of each month, in addition to being given information on the price of
inputs, you will be told whether or not you will receive weekly information updates.
Test Questions
The next two pages contain a series of test questions that we would like you to answer
before we continue. Please follow the instructions below and, using your Example Produc-
tion Revenue Sheet, do your best to answer each question. If you have any questions about
how to interpret the table or if you have any di"culty answering the questions, raise your
hand and one of us will come help you.
Please raise your hand once you have reached the end of each section of questions. We
will come around to review your answers. Do not proceed to the next section of questions
until we have met with you.
Section 1: Calculating Total Revenue
For all of the questions in this section assume that you decided to produce 6 units of output
in Week 1, 5 units in Week 2, 7 in Week 3, and 2 in Week 4. Using your Example Production
Revenue Sheet, fill in the blanks:
(1) In Week 1 your total revenue will be lab dollars.
(2) In Week 2 your total revenue will be lab dollars.
(3) In Week 3 your total revenue will be lab dollars.
(4) In Week 4 your total revenue will be lab dollars.
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(5) Your total revenue for the month will be lab dollars.
(6) If you had decided to produce 1 additional unit of output in Week 1, your total
revenue for the month would have increased by lab dollars.
(7) If you had decided to produce 1 additional unit of output in Week 4, your total
revenue for the month would have increased by lab dollars.
Section 2: Calculating Input Use
For all of the questions in this section assume that you decided to produce 6 units of
output in Week 1, 5 units in Week 2, 7 in Week 3, and 2 in Week 4. Also assume that input
conditions for each week are as follows: Normal for Week 1; Very Low for Week 2; High for
Week 3; and Normal for Week 4. Using this information fill in the blanks:
(8) In Week 1 each unit of output produced would require inputs and you would
use inputs in total.
(9) In Week 2 each unit of output produced would require inputs and you would
use inputs in total.
(10) In Week 3 each unit of output produced would require inputs and you would
use inputs in total.
(11) In Week 4 each unit of output produced would require inputs and you would
use inputs in total.
(12) The total number of inputs used for the entire month would be .
(13) If you had decided to produce 1 additional unit of output in Week 1, the total
number of inputs used for the month would have increased by .
(14) If you had decided to produce 1 additional unit of output in Week 3, the total num-
ber of inputs used for the month would have increased by .
Section 3: Calculating Total Cost and Profit
For all of the questions in this section assume that you are charged a constant per unit
price of $1 for each input used. As in the previous sections, continue to assume that 6 units
of output were produced in Week 1, 5 units in Week 2, 7 in Week 3, and 2 in Week 4 and
that input conditions for each week are as follows: Normal for Week 1; Very Low for Week
2; High for Week 3; and Normal for Week 4. Using this information fill in the blanks:
(15) The total cost of production for this month would be lab dollars.
(16) Your total profit for this month would be lab dollars.
(17) If you had decided to produce 1 additional unit of output in Week 1, your total
profit for the month would have increased by lab dollars.
(18) If you had decided to produce 1 additional unit of output in Week 3, your total





The Low-to-High variable is only used as a means to identify di!erent types of house-
hold in the model specifications where household-level fixed e!ects are not employed. This
categorical variable described in Table B.1 is defined based on the di!erence between peak
winter water consumption (the average across December, January and February) and peak
summer water consumption (the average across June, July and August). Peak winter con-
sumption will match well with average indoor water use, which doesn’t vary much. Thus
the di!erence between peak winter and peak summer use will capture the level of outdoor
water consumption. I use data from 1999 to construct this variable, which is not included in
the analysis in the main body of this paper. In the West, average winter water use is about
800cf and average outdoor water use is 3000cf. The di!erence is 2200 cf, which falls in the
middle of the categorical variables below.
Table B.1. Low-to-High Categories
Category Definition Percent of Households
(1) 133cf < w < 600 cf 12.35%
(2) 601 cf < w < 1200 cf 13.13%
(3) 1201 cf < w < 1800 cf 15.29%
(4) 1801 cf < w < 2400 cf 15.96%
(5) 2401 cf < w < 3200 cf 17.55%
(6) 3201 cf < w < 4000 cf 11.00%
(7) 4001 cf < w < 10,000 cf 14.72%
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B.2. Supplementary Tables
Table B.2. Baseline Model Results
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: ln(wit) Tri-Bill EW Dual GW Dual W Only
ln(APi,t!1) -0.758 -0.596 -0.642 -0.956
(.005)*** (.004)*** (.080)*** (.051)***
#BP days 0.039 0.029 0.034 0.037
(.001)*** (.004)*** (.008)*** (.006)***
BlockRate -0.070 -0.005 -0.079 -0.113
(.003)*** (.027) (.053) (.037)***
02Volun -0.244 -0.112 -0.114 -0.352
(.008)*** (.078) (.127) (.101)***
OneDayRestrict -0.194 -0.075 -0.187 -0.210
(.003) (.026)** (.045)*** (.034)***
TwoDayRestrict -0.171 -0.111 -0.235 -0.173
(.003)*** (.035)** (.065)*** (.046)***
ThreeDayRestrict -0.053 -0.059 -0.070 0.001
(.004)*** (.043) (.080) (.058)
0506Volun 0.060 -0.102 -0.084 0.007
(.003)*** (.031)** (.059) (.040)***
MaxTemp 0.018 0.019 0.023 0.012
(.001)*** (.001)*** (.003)*** (.002)***
Precip -0.037 -0.022 -0.042 -0.012
(.001)*** (.006)*** (.013)*** (.009)
Unemp 0.040 0.021 0.037 -0.072
(.001)*** (.006)*** (.010)*** (.007)***
constant 1.647 2.648 2.049 0.889
(0.027)*** (.221)*** (.417)*** (.297)***
Month Dummies
Household Fixed E!ects
R2 0.4480 0.3848 0.3908 0.4113
n 339,975 6,681 1,871 3,750
groups 2833 1518 681 919
Standard errors are in parentheses.
*, **, *** denotes p-values of 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 respectively.
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Table B.3. Salience Model Results
Specification (1) (2) (3)
Dependent variable: ln(wit) Tri-Bill EW Dual GW Dual
ln(APi,t!1) -0.534 -0.390 -0.504
(.004)*** (.040)*** (.078)***
ln(APi,t!1)' (Wbilli,t!1/Tbilli,t!1) -0.612 -0.505 -0.297
(.002)*** (.016)*** (.029)***
#BP days 0.040 0.041 0.039
(.001)*** (.001)*** (.008)***
BlockRate -0.048 -0.046 -0.070
(.002)*** (.002)*** (.051)
02Volun -0.345 -0.226 -0.193
(.007)*** (.071)*** (.010)***
OneDayRestrict -0.119 -0.034 -0.143
(.002) (.024) (.043)***
TwoDayRestrict -0.104 -0.108 -0.208
(.003)*** (.032)*** (.062)***
ThreeDayRestrict -0.024 -0.071 -0.064
(.004)*** (.039)* (.078)
0506Volun 0.007 -0.080 -0.053
(.002)** (.020)*** (.057)
MaxTemp 0.013 0.015 0.017
(.001)*** (.001)*** (.003)***
Precip -0.050 -0.030 -0.058
(.001)*** (.005)*** (.001)***
Unemp 0.024 0.006 0.028
(.001)*** (.005) (.010)***




R2 0.5909 0.5247 0.4884
n 339,975 6,681 1,871
groups 2833 1518 681
Standard errors are in parentheses.
*, **, *** denotes p-values of 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 respectively.
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